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4Executive Summary
The history of peacekeeping as an effective instrument of the United Nation is checkered.  
The institution of peacekeeping was relatively effective during the early period of the Cold War, 
and then became inactive during the 1970’s and 1980’s.  It was later hailed by the international 
community as indispensable in the early 1990’s following the end of the Cold War, only to be 
shunned as futile in the later half of the decade.  If the institution of peacekeeping were to 
survive, it would have to be revamped.  In March of 2000, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan 
assigned a panel of experts the task of modernizing peacekeeping practices.  The Panel on United 
Nations Peace Operations authored a report prescribing reform in twenty areas.  The Brahimi 
Report addressed several fundamental problems that plagued peacekeeping, including political 
will, lack of resources and the need for formal structures and reliable mechanisms.  This paper 
will attempt to identify these difficulties and examine their origins.
Chapter One presents the history of UN peacekeeping leading up to the Brahimi Report.  
The concept of peacekeeping first emerged in 1948 when the General Assembly of the United 
Nations sent military observers to Jerusalem to monitor the cease-fire following the partitioning 
of Palestine.  The United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) became the model 
according to which subsequent peacekeeping operations were created.  Following the Uniting for 
Peace Resolution of 1950, when the Security Council was prevented from taking action over a 
certain conflict because of Cold War politics, the General Assembly would deploy a 
peacekeeping operation to the area.  As a result, the United Nations was able to assist in the 
Korean War, despite the Soviet Union’s objection.  Between 1948 and 1989, the UN deployed 13 
peacekeeping operations; that number increased five-fold in the three years following the fall of 
the Berlin Wall.  The devastating missions in Somalia, Bosnia and Rwanda quashed the “we can 
5do anything” attitude of the early 1990’s inspired by the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait 
Observation Mission.  With confidence in peacekeeping destroyed, a panel of high-level experts 
was assembled to assess peacekeeping practices and advise on how to improve them.  The 
chapter concludes with a summary of the Brahimi Panel’s recommendations and identifies the 
principle flaws they address.
Chapter Two argues that the institution of peacekeeping is greatly impacted by the 
attitudes of UN Member States.  Because peacekeeping is not an original instrument of the UN 
Charter, it does not have all the necessary financial mechanisms.  The Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) struggles for financing because many of its activities are 
funded through sources other than the UN Regular Budget.  The Brahimi Report sought to create 
reliable financial mechanisms and would like to see the entire DPKO funded through the Regular 
Budget.  Establishing a fiduciary pre-mandate commitment authority for the Secretary-General 
and increasing the capacity of the United Nations Logistics Base require incorporating a greater 
portion of peacekeeping funding into the Regular Budget.  With more resources at its disposal, 
the DPKO will be more effective, which could boost Member States’ confidence in 
peacekeeping.
Chapter Three discusses the effort to achieve the rapid and efficient deployment of 
peacekeeping operations, and the protests made by Member States against that effort.  The 
Brahimi Report suggested that the UN demand greater commitment as part of the UN Standby 
Arrangements System and create an on-call list for important military and civilian personnel.  
The objective is for deployment to take place within 30 days for traditional peacekeeping 
operations and within 90 days for a complex peacekeeping operation, which is possible only if 
the necessary resources are secured in advance.  Member States objected to the cost of 
6maintaining resources for the UN Standby Arrangements System (UNSAS) and the geographic 
distribution of the personnel nominated for the on-call lists.
The internal and external difficulties that surfaced because of the Executive Committee 
on Peace and Security Information and Strategic Analysis Secretariat (EISAS) is the subject of 
the Chapter Four.  The Brahimi Panel suggested the organs of the Secretariat be restructured to 
consolidate all intelligence capabilities into one unit, eliminating the need to coordinate the 
efforts of multiple departments.  The EISAS would provide the UN with powerful information 
analysis and strategic planning abilities, the prospect of which frightened many developing 
countries.  The quest to become proactive has led the United Nations to seek the assistance of 
think tanks and universities.
The conclusion of the paper argues that the Brahimi Report should be judged as a catalyst 
for progress, and offers an explanation of the protests presented by various Member States.  It 
examines the reasons behind Non-Aligned Movement’s opposition to most of the 
recommendations of the Brahimi Panel.  Although not all of the objections can be justified, most 
are warranted.  Finally, the conclusion suggests issues for future research.  
7Chapter I: Cold War Politics Thaw: 
Confidence in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Soars High Then Crashes
On March 7, 2000, United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan commissioned a high 
level panel to undertake a comprehensive review of UN activities in the maintenance of peace 
and security.  Over the course of four months, the panel, chaired by Mr. Lakhdar Brahimi, 
analyzed all aspects of past and then current peacekeeping operations from preparation and 
deployment to intelligence capabilities and exit strategies.  They were to assess the ability of the 
United Nations to effectively conduct peace operations.  The Panel on United Nations 
Peacekeeping Operations issued a report on August 17, 2000, referred to herein as the Brahimi 
Report, which offered frank, specific and realistic recommendations for reforms to enhance the 
United Nations capacity for peace operations.  The contents of the Brahimi Report have been the 
subject of much debate both within the Organization and among independent observers.  Not all 
of the recommendations were well received; although some reforms were implemented promptly 
and without argument, and others have spurred progressive action, some of the recommendations 
have been the subject of intense debate and have been barred from completion.  
Terminology
For the purpose of this paper the term peacekeeping will be used to mean all United 
Nations Security Council authorized third-party intervention, except those with an original 
Chapter VII mandate that includes the use of “all means necessary” against a clearly defined 
aggressor.  Thus the United Nations authorized action against Iraq in January 1991, and 
8involvement in Korea in the 1950’s, are not peacekeeping operations but instead collective 
enforcement actions.  
The term “traditional peacekeeping” herein refers to a peacekeeping operation that is 
impartial and does not seek to influence the political outcome of the conflict.  Troops involved in 
such operations are lightly armed for self-defense purposes only and adhere to minimal force 
doctrine.  In traditional peacekeeping operations intervention is based on the continuing consent 
from all parties involved, and remains a necessity for the duration of the mission.  
Not all interventions in the name of peace that are sanctioned by the United Nations fit 
the criteria for either enforcement actions under Chapter VII or traditional peacekeeping 
operations under Chapter VI of the Charter.  There is a wide spectrum of peacekeeping 
operations that embody aspects of both.  Operations that fall between the two extremes will be 
referred to as “complex-peacekeeping” operations.
“International community” is a collective term that will herein refer to the political elite 
within the United Nations and Member States and the state-level decision makers of Member 
States.
End of Cold War Brings Renewed Hope Short-lived
Collective security as envisioned by the Charter of the United Nations never became a 
reality.  Included in the Charter is the provision for armed forces to be made available to the 
Security Council by Member States in accordance with special agreements as established under 
Article 43.  No such agreements have been negotiated because the permanent Members of the 
Security Council and its Military Staff Committee could not resolve their disagreements 
concerning the size and composition of their respective national contributions or where the 
9armed forces should be based.1  The Soviet-American rivalry during the Cold War was reflected 
in the Security Council; the UN was rendered incapable of exercising the authority to sanction 
collective security actions enshrined within Chapter VII of its Charter.  But the United Nations 
was to remain relevant in the area of international security; the immobilized Security Council 
was circumvented.  The Uniting for Peace Resolution of November 1950 officially recognized 
the responsibility of the General Assembly to address issues of international security on which 
the Security Council is unable to act.  Except when ‘the Security Council is exercising in respect 
of any dispute or situation the functions assigned to it in the present Charter,’2 Chapter VI of the 
Charter authorizes the General Assembly to consider any question or matter within the scope of the 
Charter.  The Resolution allowed for seven members of the Security Council (the number of 
consenting votes required has since been increased to nine) or a majority of the member-states to call 
an emergency meeting of the General Assembly to consider a matter that had been blocked by a veto 
in the Security Council.3 The Uniting for Peace Resolution gave birth to the invention of the 
concept of peacekeeping.  The “Uniting for Peace” Plan, for which U.S. Secretary State Dean 
Acheson is given credit, was invoked by Yugoslavia in 1956 after Israel invaded Egypt.  The 
British and the French vetoed the resolutions drafted by the United States and the Soviet Union 
demanding that Israel withdraw from Egypt.  Since the Security Council was unable to take 
action, the matter was sent to the General Assembly.  On November 7, 1956, the General 
Assembly instructed the Secretary-General to proceed with his plan to establish the UN 
1
 United Nations, Military Staff Committee, “Report by the Military Staff Committee to the Security Council on the 
General Principles Governing the Organization of the Armed Forces Made Available to the Security Council by 
Member Nations of the United Nations, 30 April 1947;” International Organizations, Vol. 1, No. 3 (September, 
1947), 561-74.
2
 United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, Chapter IV, art. 10, sec. 12.
3
 Stanley Meisler, United Nations: The First Fifty Years (The Atlantic Monthly Press: New York, 1995), 65.
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Emergency Force to monitor the end of the hostilities between the Israelis and Egyptians.  This 
was the first UN peacekeeping operation in history.4
Comments made by Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev of renewed commitment to the 
United Nations and genuine support for the Security Council model of collective security in 
September 1989 and then the fall of the Berlin Wall that same year inspired a renewed hope in 
the capacity of the United Nations to fulfill its purpose, in the words of its Charter, “to save 
succeeding generations from the scourges of war…and for these ends…to unite our strength to 
maintain international peace and security.”  Following the collective enforcement action, which 
successfully forced the Iraqi military out of Kuwait, a United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation 
Mission (UNIKOM) was established to observe the cease-fire and monitor the demilitarized zone 
along the Iraq-Kuwait boundary.  The success experienced by UNIKOM in April 1991, fostered 
a feeling of “we can do anything” within the politics of the United Nations.  The year 1992 saw a 
five-fold increase in both the number of peace operations assumed by the United Nations and the 
number of personnel involved in such operations.  The sudden increase in volume alone posed a 
challenge; for a decade following the 1978 creation of United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon 
(UNIFIL) the United Nations did not field a new peacekeeping operation.5  Three years after 
UNIKOM confidence in the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations took a serious blow.  
The end of the Cold War brought not only an increase in United Nations activities in 
international security, it brought an increase in media coverage of such operations as well.  The 
1990’s saw advances in communications technology and more near-live coverage of combat 
situations.  Media began to actively follow peacekeeping operations, broadcasting almost 
instantly reports and images of conflict confronted by UN peacekeeping personnel.  The CNN-
4
 Meisler, 107-11.
5
 Lawrence Ziring, Robert Riggs and Jack Plano, The United Nations: International Organization and World 
Politics (Harcourt College Publishers: New York, 2000), 185.
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effect, as it is commonly referred to, agitated the national constituents of Member States and 
influenced the political will of national decision makers to commit resources to UN peace 
operations.  By the mid-1990’s, a few media-saturated peace operations forays had lead some 
political elites, practitioners and scholars to pronounce hurried and broad generalizations which 
resulted in a loss of faith in the ability of the United Nations to engage in effective international 
security activities.6  The Clinton Administration was forced to withdraw American forces from 
the United Nations operation in Somalia following the domestic outcry caused by the televised 
death of an American pilot of a Black Hawk, which had been shot down by the followers of 
Somali General Aidid.  
On April 6, 1992, the Serbs of Yugoslavia undertook a campaign of ethnic cleansing.  
Within the first sixty days of the fighting, approximately one million people were displaced.  The 
international community responded with an arms embargo, humanitarian intervention and a UN 
peacekeeping operation, UNPROFOR.  UNPROFOR set up six safe areas for the protection of 
displaced persons.  The mandate authorized UN personnel to use force to “deter attacks” on 
Srebrenica and the five other safe areas.  The mandate was insufficient to protect the people 
involved, and nearly 20,000 people in and around the safe areas, including a majority of the 117 
UN peacekeeping officials lost their lives.  The fall of the safe area of Srebrenica resulted in a 
terrible massacre of the Muslim people.  “We [The United Nations] tried to keep the peace and 
apply the rules of peacekeeping when there was no peace to keep…we tried to eschew the use of 
force except in self-defense, which brought us into conflict with the defenders of the safe areas, 
whose safety depended on our use of force.”7  The international community failed to act 
6
 Cindy Collins and Thomas G. Weiss, An Overview and Assessment of 1989-1996 Peace Operations Publication
(Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for International Studies: Providence, 1997), 12.
7
 United Nations, General Assembly, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 
53/35: The Fall of Srebrenica, 54th sess., 15 November 1999, A/54/549, para. 488.
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decisively during the operation of UNPROFOR until the decision to undertake a concerted 
military effort after the last attack on Sarajevo.  The fall of Srebrenica was the result of 
inadequate resources, inappropriate implementation of policy and political failings.
Two days after the infamous Black Hawk Down incident, the Security Council 
authorized a humanitarian intervention in Rwanda, United Nations Assistance Mission to 
Rwanda (UNAMIR), but refused to official recognize the true nature of this civil conflict.  On 
April 6, 1994, the airplane carrying Rwandan President Juvenal Habyarimana, Burundian 
President Cyprien Ntaryamira and several top aides was shot down by surface to air missiles.  
The plane was en-route from Tanzania, where the statesmen had completed the negotiations on 
the implementation of the 1993 Arusha peace accord that called for a broad-based Hutu-Tutsi 
government in Rwanda.  The peace accord was meant to bring an end to civil war with the Tutsi 
expatriate force, the Rwanda Patriotic Front; it was met with strong opposition from the 
extremists within Habyarimana’s own government, who are suspected in the plane crash.  The 
death of the president triggered what was later acknowledged to be genocide and restarted the 
latent civil war.  The death toll was suspected to be in the tens of thousand within the first two 
weeks.  
In response, the United Nations allowed a small contingent to remain in Rwanda to 
secure a cease-fire and safety for foreign civilians.  The United States and other countries 
provided logistical support for delivery of humanitarian aid to refugee camps.  The French 
eventually intervened militarily and established a safe zone in the southwest region of the 
country.  It is generally agreed that the Members of the UN failed to fulfill their legal and moral 
obligations to the Rwandans.  There were several opportunities at which a rapid reaction force 
13
could have been strategically deployed to positively affect the civil war.8  Instead UNAMIR, a 
traditional peacekeeping operation with Chapter VI authorization, was deployed under hostile 
conditions more suited to a peacemaking operation with Chapter VII mandate.  There existed 
strong political pressure to quash the use of the term genocide in connection with the civil war in 
Rwanda.  The United Nations Genocide Convention deemed an act of genocide to be a crime 
against humanity; crimes against humanity carry substantial legal weight in addition to moral 
obligations for Members of the UN under the Charter.  National decision makers of key 
Members of the UN were not willing to meet such obligations.  The April 1994 genocide in 
Rwanda effectively destroyed the confidence of the international community in peacekeeping 
operations and consolidated the position of “we can do nothing” among Member States and 
state-level decision makers.   
Brahimi Report: Culmination of Self-Criticism
The memory of the Rwandan genocide of April 1994 coupled with the fall of the UN 
safe-area in Srebrenica, Bosnia in July of 1995 and the collapse of Somalia tarnished the 
international community’s confidence in UN peacekeeping, from planning and organization to 
command and execution.  In the subsequent years the General Assembly requested that the 
Secretary-General conduct thorough reviews of the fall of Srebrenica and why the UN failed to 
act in Rwanda.  The reports uncovered a range of problems ranging from organizational 
deficiencies and inadequate resources to political limitations.  This sparked a degree of self-
criticism within United Nations that is not commonplace for large organizations.  This internal 
critique climaxed when Annan commissioned the Brahimi Panel to investigate all aspects of UN 
8
 Carl Kaysen and George Rathjens, “Peace Operations by the United Nations: The Case for a Voluntary UN 
Military Force,” (Committee on International Security Studies: Cambridge, 1996), 32-7.
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peacekeeping.  The Brahimi Panel included personalities reflecting a wide geographic 
distribution, with diverse experiences in the fields of peacekeeping, peace building, development 
and humanitarian assistance.  The members of the Panel were Mr. Lakhdar Brahimi (chair), Mr. 
J. Brian Atwood, Ambassador Colin Granderson, Dame Ann Hercus, Mr. Richard Monk, 
General Klaus Naumann (retired), Ms. Hisako Shimura, Ambassador Vladimir Shustov, General 
Philip Sibanda and Dr. Cornelio Sommaruga.  The Panel found that “without significant 
institutional change, increased financial support, and renewed commitment on the part of 
Member States, the UN will not be capable of executing the critical peacekeeping and peace 
building tasks that the Member States assign it in coming months and years.”9  The Panel 
produced a forty-eight-page report that included recommendations in twenty key areas that 
represented what they felt was “the minimum threshold of change needed to give the United 
Nations system the opportunity to be an effective, operational, twenty-first century institution.”10
Summary of Recommendations
The Brahimi Report suggested reform in twenty key areas, ranging from preventative 
actions and exit strategies to information gathering and strategic analysis and the rapid 
deployment of troops.  While some of the recommendations were implemented almost 
immediately without any substantial objections, several areas of the Brahimi Report have been 
subject of intense controversy, and other recommendations have been outright rejected.  In 
certain areas the actual changes that have been made resemble a mere shadow of the suggested 
reforms.  The fate the Brahimi Report is in part the result of budgetary and resource restrictions, 
but politics and will have also had a considerable effect on peacekeeping reform.  
9
 United Nations, General Assembly/Security Council, The Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace 
Operations, 55th sess., 21 August 2000, A/55/305, S/2000/809, para. 1. 
10
 A/55/305, S/2000/809; para. 7.
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When the Brahimi Report was released in August of 2000, the initial response of the 
United Nations was overwhelmingly positive.  Members of every political alignment praised the 
Panel for their honest and thoughtful analysis of the then current framework of peace operations.  
But when the real discussion began over the details of the report, there emerged a divergence in 
opinions.  Individual Member States questioned the necessity of various reforms; some Member 
States went as far as to question the intent and purpose behind certain recommendations.  A few 
recommendations were ruled out because of financial limitations, such as the creation of one 
hundred-fifty new posts and the addition of a new Assistant Secretary-General, which the 
Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ) deemed to be 
beyond the financial means of the United Nations.  Most of these recommendations were revised 
and implemented on a smaller scale.
The Brahimi Report delved into the clarification and definition of doctrine, as well as 
peacekeeping strategy and decision-making.  It examined possible methods for achieving rapid 
and effective deployment of peace operations, and the need for additional resources.  It also 
made suggestions to restructure UN Headquarters so it would be better equipped to plan for and 
support peacekeeping operations.  The Brahimi Report did not limit itself to DPKO; it 
recommended structural and organizational adjustments be made in most departments of the 
Secretariat.  It also addressed how best to utilize the technological advances of the information 
age.
While the Brahimi Panel praised the fundamental principles of traditional peacekeeping, 
they concluded that the nature of peacekeeping changed significantly during the 1990’s and 
reform of the system is crucial.  Heedlessly adhering to such principles as the necessity of 
consent, impartiality and minimal force doctrine led to the failure of peace operations when open 
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hostility broke out between the opposing parties.  The UN must be able to meet such challenges 
in the future; the rules of engagement must be stout.  The Brahimi Report emphasized the need 
for truthful and thorough assessment of the conflict, and a realistic and practical mandate to 
manage the situation.  The Report called on the Security Council to leave resolutions authorizing 
peace operations in draft form until the Secretary-General is able to determine what resources 
will be available for the operation, so that the scope of the mandate does not exceed what is 
realistically possible.  It also recommended all contributing Member States be allowed a greater 
voice in preparing the mandate.
The Brahimi Report also addressed expanding the information-gathering and strategic 
planning capacities of the Secretary-General.  Without improved informational capabilities 
preventative action will be beyond the reach of the Secretariat.  The Executive Committee on 
Peace and Security (ECPS) Information and Strategic Analysis Secretariat (EISAS) would create 
and keep integrated databases on peace and security issues, which it would share with the 
appropriate organs of the United Nations.  It would also analyze policy and generate long-term 
strategies for the ECPS and alert it of potentially dangerous situations.  The EISAS would 
consolidate the existing Situation Center of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) 
with other existing small but scattered policy planning offices, and it would also incorporate 
military analysts, international criminal experts and information systems specialists.  The success 
of EISAS would involve the effective use of information technology, which will require a center 
responsible for user-level information technology strategy and policy for peace operations.
Preparation and preparedness is essential for the success of peace operations.  Rapid 
deployment is crucial in preventing further escalation of conflict.  The Brahimi Report suggested 
a deployment schedule of thirty days after the Security Council adopts a resolution for a 
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traditional peacekeeping operation and of ninety days for a complex peacekeeping mission.  To 
facilitate rapid deployment the Brahimi Panel recommends an on-call list of qualified personnel 
to fill critical posts should be created and the United Nations Standby Arrangements System 
should be improved to include several brigade-sized forces that are trained specifically for 
peacekeeping operations and can ready for rapid deployment.  It would be a revolving list that is 
continuously updated of qualified military officers and civilian personnel, who could be 
available for the planning stages of a mission and as such facilitate the rapid deployment of 
troops.  On-call lists of experienced personnel should also be created for all posts critical for 
every stage of peacekeeping operations.  According to the Brahimi Report, the addition of 
several start-up kits to the United Nations Logistics Base (UNLB) in Brindisi, Italy, along with 
greater budgetary authority for the Secretary-General during the pre-mandate and planning stage 
of peace operations would also greatly facilitate rapid deployment.
Peacekeeping must be treated as a primary function of the UN; as such, the Brahimi 
Panel recommended that DPKO be funded through the regular budget of the Organization.  They 
also called for the immediate increase in resources for all DPKO offices and related 
Headquarters, which, at that time, accounted for approximately two percent of the total cost of 
peacekeeping.  The increase in resources would allow for a significant number of new posts, 
including a third Assistant Secretary-General to the Department of Peacekeeping, to be 
designated as “Principal Assistant Secretary-General,” and act as the deputy to the Under-
Secretary-General.  The Brahimi Panel recommended creating Integrated Mission Task Forces 
(IMTFs) to aid in the planning of new missions and assist in the effective deployment of 
operations.  The IMTF would coordinate the efforts of the necessary offices and various entities.  
DPKO would also benefit from structural adjustments, for example separating both the Military 
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and Civilian Police Division, and the Field Administration and Logistics Divisions into two 
independent divisions.  The Brahimi Panel also suggested that several offices and divisions 
within the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Political Affairs be 
strengthened.  
This paper focuses on three areas of reform addressed by the Brahimi Report.  These 
reforms would greatly benefit future peacekeeping operations, but have proven difficult to 
accomplish.  First it will examine the idea of pre-mandate commitment authority (PMCA) that 
the Brahimi Panel suggested be given to the Secretary-General, as well as the benefit to be 
gained by increasing the permanent stock of peacekeeping resources and equipment held by the 
UN at the Logistics Base in Brindisi, Italy.  The Brahimi Panel felt that the Secretary- General 
should be granted the authority to access up to $50 million during the planning stages of a 
peacekeeping mission.  The Secretary-General would be free to use the funds at his discretion, 
even before the Security Council formally sanctions the operation.  The Organization should also 
make the significant investment in peacekeeping involved in increasing the number of start-up 
kits in stock at UNLB, for a total of five.
Second, this paper considers the rapid deployment of troops within the proposed 
timeframes for traditional and complex peacekeeping operations.  To accomplish this goal, the 
Brahimi Panel suggested compiling a comprehensive list of potential representatives or special 
representatives of the Secretary-General, force commanders, civilian police commissioners, and 
deputies as well as other heads of substantive and administrative components.  The list should be 
subject to a fair gender and geographic distribution and open to input from Member States.  
From that list DPKO can draw a revolving “on-call list” of approximately 100 military officers 
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that can be ready for deployment within seven days from notice.  The UN should establish a 
three-month training program for persons nominated to the list and provide them with a refresher 
orientation and mission-specific training closer to actual deployment.  
The recommendation to create an additional secretariat to meet the informational and 
strategic planning needs of the ECPS is the third reform to be discussed.  Known as the 
Information and Strategic Analysis Secretariat, the Brahimi Report intended EISAS to be 
administered by and report jointly to the heads of the Department of Political Affairs and the 
Department of Peacekeeping Operations.  EISAS would have preventative, peacekeeping and 
post-conflict responsibilities.  Establishing EISAS would require the Secretariat to accomplish an 
unprecedented degree of coordination and cooperation among UN departments, as well as 
institutional reorganization.  
These three areas of reform will be used to highlight more fundamental problems 
preventing peacekeeping from becoming a truly effective tool for maintaining international 
peace and security.
Fundamental Difficulties Face Peacekeeping Practices
When taken in its entirety, the ultimate goal of the Brahimi Report is to make the UN an 
effective actor in international peace and security.  With this objective in mind, the Brahimi 
Panel sought to correct several fundamental problems with the culture and practices of 
peacekeeping as it had come to be over half a century.  The Brahimi Panel wrote for the benefit 
of both the United Nations and its Member States.  Many of the recommendations are political in 
nature and require direct support, participation and funding from Member States.  The Brahimi 
Panel thought that if these reforms were implemented, Members States would be forces to 
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officially recognize peacekeeping as a fundamental responsibility and function of the United 
Nations.  Elevating the status of peacekeeping is the goal addressed in the next chapter.  Because 
peacekeeping was first created as an ad hoc solution to an impasse in the Security Council and 
because the Charter does not contain any specific provision for peacekeeping, it has been treated 
and funded as a lesser function of the UN.  Peacekeeping has yet to receive the institutional 
respect it needs to become an effective tool of the UN.   
Slow and inefficient deployment of troops and resources is a significant detriment to 
peacekeeping.  The events that took place in Rwanda in April 1994 made rapid and efficient 
deployment of missions a top priority for the Brahimi Panel.  Although the UN immediately 
identified the conflict, the UN lacked formal practices and procedures from establishing and 
planning a peacekeeping operation; the existing mechanisms were time consuming and lacked 
certainty.  As more time passed, the situation in Rwanda became more difficult to resolve.  The 
Brahimi Panel attempted to address this flaw through a series of reforms that would allow for as 
much preparation as far in advance of deployment as possible, which is taken up in the Chapter 
Three.  The ability to deploy peacekeeping missions in the early stages of a conflict could limit 
the complexity of the task faced by UN troops.  They hoped that an on-call list of personnel and 
that strengthening the UNSAS would substantially decrease deployment time.
The creation of EISAS would require restructuring the Secretariat and embracing 
technological advances.  New threats to international peace and security emerge daily and the 
nature of international conflict is ever changing; yet peacekeeping practices and mechanisms 
have remained fundamentally the same.  While the institution experienced relative success 
during the Cold War and was revered during the early 1990’s, the experiences of the final years 
of the twentieth century made it obvious that greater flexibility and adaptability was need if the 
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system was to function.  The successful establishment of the EISAS would signify the 
willingness of the UN to adapt to meet unprecedented situations in the future, and it would set a 
precedent for further flexibility necessitated by fluctuations in international political dynamics.
Before the Brahimi Report
Prior to the release of the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations 
substantial planning for the proposed peace operation was held until after the Security Council 
approved the mandate for the mission.  After the Security Council passed a resolution, the 
Secretary-General was then free to solicit Member States for the resources allotted to the mission 
by the resolution.  The Security Council authorized the deployment of resources that it deemed 
necessary to fulfill the mandate, but it was not always within the power of the Secretary-General 
to assemble such resources.  The result was often an under-staffed, under-resourced United 
Nations peacekeeping force that was unable to complete its mandate.  The United Nations 
involvement in Rwanda fell victim to this weakness in the preparation stage.  In May of 1994, 
the Security Council authorized UNAMIR to be expanded from 2,500 troops to 5,500.  Boutros-
Ghali was unable to obtain commitment for the full increase in troops; ultimately about five 
hundred additional troops were sent.  
Before the Brahimi Report, the UN’s information and strategic analysis capacity was 
limited to small individual offices spread across the Secretariat, without a framework for 
coordinating information. The Lessons Learned Unit of the Department of Political Affairs 
operated separately from the Policy Analysis Unit and Situation Center of the Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations, as do other complementary offices.  The primary concerns of the 
policy and planning units of the ECPS tended to be day-today issues and the ECPS lacked the 
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capacity for forward-looking strategies.  The Secretary-General’s initial reform package of 1997 
attempted to coordinate the activities of various divisions of the Secretariat, but had yet to realize 
its intended purpose at the time of the Brahimi Report. 
The United Nations never negotiated special agreements with Member States to 
secure military forces for used by the Security Council; instead any operation undertaken by the 
United Nations requires the Secretary-General to ask Member States for resources on an ad hoc 
basis.  In 1997, the initial steps were taken in acknowledging the importance of rapid and 
efficient deployment of troops to areas of conflict.  A Standby High Readiness Brigade 
(SHIRBRIG) by means of a Security Council resolution was authorized to address this need.  At 
the same time the Department of Peacekeeping was provided with a Mission Planning division, 
the UNSAS, and the Rapidly Deployable Mission Headquarters.11  But the UNSAS has yet to 
become a reliable source for resources; Member States, under the UNSAS, retain the right to say 
no to the request of the Secretary-General, even within the level of resources agreed upon by the 
arrangement.  The availability of military supplies and equipment is also a significant concern.  
The mission start-up kits held in reserve at UNLB are critical for the rapid deployment of a 
mission, but the reserves are frequently depleted and not promptly replenished.
The UN, in the articles of its Charter, was intended to have the capacity to conduct 
activities in the area of international security, but has effectively yet to realize this ability.  The 
recommendations made within the Brahimi Report represent the most realistic and feasible 
possibilities for reform towards this end.  Some obstacles are financial or time-restricted in 
nature, but many are political.  A review of the range of political responses to individual areas of 
the Brahimi Report will help to expose the real potential for reform UN peacekeeping and its 
limits.
11
 Ziring, 172-3.
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Chapter II: Commitment of Funds for Peacekeeping: 
Elevating Peacekeeping Operations to a Primary Function of the UN
The various financial and budgetary reforms recommended by the Brahimi Report 
address two fundamental defects from which UN peacekeeping suffers.  The more apparent 
objective of the financial and budgetary reforms is to improve the rapid and efficient deployment 
of peace operations (this we will examine in Chapter Three).  The less obvious objective of these 
reforms is to confer upon peacekeeping the level of respect it deserves.  Because of the method 
by which the first peacekeeping operation was conceived, it has never received the funding and 
institutionalization deserving of an important and complex tool of the United Nations.  The 
Brahimi Report suggests a variety of reforms that would institutionalize peacekeeping and 
encourage Member States to recognize it as a primary function of the Organization.  This chapter 
will examine the outcome of the debate surrounding the recommendations to create pre-mandate 
commitment authority (PMCA) for the Secretary-General and to increase the resources in reserve 
at the United Nations Logistics Base (UNLB) in Brindisi, Italy, with respect to the status of 
peacekeeping.
There is no article in the UN Charter that refers to peacekeeping.  Peacekeeping was first 
devised as a creative solution to stalemate in the Security Council.  When Cold War politics 
prevented the Security Council from taking action, peacekeeping was the General Assembly’s 
improvised answer.  Later, the Security Council embraced it as an alternative to the compulsory 
enforcement action described in Chapter VII of the UN Charter.  The legality of peacekeeping 
has been a source of debate since its conception, and it is often referred to as falling under 
Chapter VI ½ authority.  Because only 13 peacekeeping missions were deployed during the 40 
years following the first operation to the Middle East, peacekeeping became seen as a tool only 
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to be employed on an ad hoc basis.  As a result, peacekeeping is not funded through the Regular 
Budget; peacekeeping assessments are made on an ad hoc basis.  
The Organization’s attitude toward peacekeeping began to change with the explosion of 
missions in the early to mid-1990s, and there was an attempt to establish a reliable source for 
funding.  Through subsequent resolutions starting in 1992, the General Assembly adopted a 
series of reforms to reduce the lead-time of a mission, including the creation of the Peacekeeping 
Reserve Fund.12  The General Assembly established the fund, which amounts to $150 million 
when fully capitalized, to be a pool of money readily available to the Secretary-General for start-
up costs.  Upon the approval of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary 
Questions (ACABQ), the Secretary-General can draw up to $50 million from the fund during the 
planning stage of a new mission or an unexpected expansion of an existing operation.  The 
Peacekeeping Reserve Funds, though, was only available to the Secretary-General after the 
Security Council mandated the peace operation or its expansion.
The United Nations Charter dictates that the Security Council attempt to settle a dispute 
through peaceful means before resorting to force.13  Once a conflict is identified, exploring 
diplomatic means to resolving the situation requires a significant amount of time.  During this 
stage of the conflict, the Secretary-General does not have the means with which to prepare for a 
possible UN intervention if diplomatic tactics were not successful.  Only after the Security 
Council authorized a peacekeeping mission was the Secretary-General allowed to begin planning 
the mission and solicit Member States for the needed troops and resources, at which stage much 
valuable time would have been wasted that could have been used to ensure rapid deployment of 
12
 UN General Assembly Resolution 47/217 (23 December 1992) established the Peacekeeping Reserve Fund; 
resolutions 49/233 A (23 December 1994) and 51/218 E (17 June 1997) modified the size of and criteria for the use 
of the fund, as it stood at the release of the Brahimi Report.
13 Charter of the United Nations, Chap. VI, art. 33.
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the operation.  The Brahimi Report called for “pre-mandate commitment authority” to be granted 
to the Secretary-General, which means that the Secretary-General would have access to the 
Peacekeeping Reserve Fund prior to the Security Council resolution authorizing a peacekeeping 
operation so that the necessary resources, personnel and equipment can be secured and the 
mission can be deployed sooner. 
Pre-Mandate Commitment Authority
Officially, the concept of the pre-mandate commitment authority for the Secretary-
General was well received.  In the annex to its resolution 1327 (2000), the Security Council 
encouraged the Secretary-General to take all possible measures within his authority to facilitate 
rapid deployment of the mission during the planning and preparation phase of a peace operation.  
The Security Council expressed its approval of a more active Secretariat during the pre-mandate 
stage of a mission by promising to assist the Secretary-General “with specific planning mandates 
requesting him to take the necessary administrative steps to prepare the rapid deployment of a 
mission.”14  The Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations also endorsed the 
recommendation of the Brahimi Panel in its report to the General Assembly during the 55th
session, and continues to express its support in each additional report on the question of 
peacekeeping operations.15
While the Organization’s official stance toward PMCA was positive, the reaction of 
individual Member States varied.  The developed countries tended to support the proposed 
budgetary mechanisms, but many of the developing countries favored resolving past debts owed 
to Member States before apportioning any additional funds to peacekeeping.  The delegation 
14
 UN Security Council, Recommendations on Peacekeeping Operations, S/RES/1327, 13 November 2000, Annex I
15
 UN General Assembly, Comprehensive Review of the Whole Question of Peacekeeping Operations in all their 
Aspects, 55th sess., 31 July 2001, A/55/1024.
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from the Republic of Korea recognized the importance of allowing the Secretary-General leeway 
during the planning stages of a mission and fully backed PMCA.16  Kurt Mosgaard, a member of 
the Denmark delegation and speaking on behalf of the European Union and associated States, 
acknowledged the pre-mandate commitment authority as an essential element in the quest for 
rapid deployment.17  The United States also felt that the Secretary-General should be allowed 
access to sufficient funds to prepare for deployment of a probable mission and gave its support to 
PMCA.18  But many developing countries in the Non-aligned Movement were not as enthusiastic 
about allowing the Secretary-General easier access to greater funds for peacekeeping.  Having 
loaned substantial resources to the UN, they were concerned that they may be unnecessarily 
penalized because other Member States had failed to fulfill their financial obligations to the 
Organization; Uruguay, South Africa, Egypt, Nigeria, Bangladesh and others shared such 
concerns. 19
Despite the initial hesitation of several Member States to grant PMCA to the Secretary-
General, the General Assembly, at the advice of the ACABQ and the request of the Secretary-
General, has made provisions to allow the Secretary-General access to funds prior to the Security 
Council adopting peacekeeping mandate.  These mechanisms could expedite the deployment of 
troops once the operation received its mandate.  In his report to the General Assembly, 14 March 
2002, the Secretary-General urged the General Assembly and ACABQ to authorize PMCA, as 
recommended by the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations20:
16
 UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, “Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations Ends Two-
Day Debate on Need for Rapid Deployment,” 12 February 2002, GA/PK/175.
17
 UN General Assembly, “Reform, Peacekeeper Misconduct, Criteria for Senior-Level Appointments Among Issues 
Raised in Fourth Committee Debate on Peacekeeping,” 57th sess., 21 October 2002, GA/SPD/245.
18
 UN General Assembly, 5th Committee, “Proposal to Postpone Repayment to Member States of Cash Balances 
from Closed Peacekeeping Missions Taken up in Budget Committee,” 58th sess., 17 March 2004, GA/AB/3607.
19
 GA/AB/3607
20
 A/55/305, S/2000/809, para. 164.
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29. …The Organization is taking positive action to achieve rapid deployment, and 
pre-mandate financial commitment authority is essential in order to meet this 
goal. The Secretary-General made a further proposal in this regard in paragraphs 
117-119 of document A/55/977.21
In the aforementioned report, paragraph 35 presented an outline for rapid deployment, 
which would require the pre-mandate commitment authority in the second step.  The ACABQ 
endorsed the outline and stated in its report that “…the actions and activities envisaged by the 
Secretary-General in paragraph 35 of document A/56/870 fall within the scope of the start-up 
phase referred to in General Assembly resolution 49/233 A, section IV, paragraph 122.”  The 
ACABQ went further in its endorsement of the proposed pre-mandate commitment authority, 
stating that PMCA is consistent with the recommendations of the Brahimi Panel.23  The outline 
for rapid deployment of a mission was subsequently codified by General Assembly resolution.24
Because PMCA is required in the second step of the outline for rapid deployment, the Secretary-
General is consequently afforded the power.
Even though the ACABQ and General Assembly approved the pre-mandate commitment 
authority, and many Member States recognized its inherent value, the allocated funds were not 
immediately utilized for various reasons.  Preparation for the United Nations Mission in Cote 
d’Ivoire (MINUCI) brought to light the faults of the then current PMCA mechanisms.  The Best 
Practices Unit, at the request of the General Assembly, prepared an After Action Report 
21
 UN General Assembly, The Concept of Strategic Deployment Stocks and Its Implementation, 56th sess., Secretary-
General, 14 March 2002, A/56/870.
22
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Council relating to the start-up phase or expansion phase of peace-keeping operations results in the need for 
expenditure, the Secretary-General is authorized, with the prior concurrence of the ACABQ and subject to the 
Financial Regulations of the United Nations…to enter into commitments not to exceed 50 million United States 
dollars per decision of the Security Council… however, appropriation by the General Assembly of any outstanding 
commitments shall automatically restore the balance of the limit of 150 million dollars to the extent of the amount 
appropriated” (23 December 1994).
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24
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concerning the difficulties the Secretary-General faced when attempting to access the resources 
granted to him by resolutions A/RES/56/256 (18 July 2002) and A/RES/56/292.  MINUCI was 
the first opportunity to use PMCA since it was proposed in 2000.  The After Action Report 
concluded that the Secretary-General and DPKO did not seek to utilize the pre-mandate 
commitment authority because it was uncertain that the Security Council would authorize 
MINUCI; it was thought that the mission would be relatively limited in size and scope; and there 
were alternative resources available during preparation.25  The Secretariat was allowed to finance 
the first six months of MINUCI from the Regular Budget as if it would proceed as a 
peacekeeping mission,26 and it also made use of materials leftover from UNAMSIL and 
UNMIBH.  Although the possibility of employing PMCA was discussed, the staff expressed a 
general lack of familiarity with the process and decided to continue with more traditional 
procedures.  The staff was also unaware that there existed a less-complicated alternative to the 
Peacekeeping Reserve Fund, which would have been more suited to the projected small size of 
the mission.  At no time was the possibility of utilizing the unforeseen and extraordinary expense 
budget explored.27  Afterward, Secretary-General Kofi Annan was able to obtain from the 
ACABQ post-commitment authority the amount of $14 million to meet the cost of the most 
essential and immediate start-up requirements of the Mission for the period from 13 May to 31 
December 2003.28  The Best Practices Unit concluded that: “PMCA mechanisms do exist and do 
provide sufficient latitude to obtain pre-mandate financing for missions in a reasonably 
25
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26
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expeditious manner,” and that DPKO and between the DPKO and the Controller’s Office and 
Member States there needs to be a greater understanding of the different mechanisms at their 
disposal. 29  It was suggested in the report that guidelines be established and trigger mechanisms 
be agreed upon to prevent missed opportunities in the future.
The Secretary-General did invoke the pre-mandate commitment authority during the 
preparatory stage of the United Nations mission to Liberia (UNMIL).  At the time of this paper, 
the United Nations had yet to publicize the details of the PMCA mechanisms utilized by the 
Secretary-General while preparing for the deployment of UNMIL.  Details released of Special 
Committee on Peacekeeping Operations meetings have alluded to the fact that PMCA was used 
and proved beneficial.  Peter Hammerschmidt, of the Canadian delegation, speaking also for 
Australia and New Zealand, made reference to the importance of PMCA in achieving the 
progress made in Liberia:
UNMIL was also something of a milestone for the United Nations and its 
Member States…It was the first major deployment since the establishment of the 
Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea, and since the implementation of the 
recommendations contained in the Brahimi report…He said those delegations 
could already point to a number of ways in which UNMIL deployment 
represented an improvement over the past…The early mobilization of resources 
had been improved by the creation and employment of pre-mandate commitment 
authority and strategic deployment stocks.30
Other delegations present during the discussion of the mission also acknowledged the importance 
of the pre-mandate commitment authority.
29
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The ACABQ issued an opinion on posting the return of ‘available cash’ to Member 
States that bolstered institutional support for PMCA.31  Although the decision ultimately 
belonged to the General Assembly, the ACABQ felt that the available money would better be 
used to pad the Peacekeeping Reserve Fund rather than resolve UN debt.  The ACABQ offered 
its opinion in light of the upcoming UN missions to Cote d’Ivoire, Haiti and Sudan, each of 
which will require a pre-mandate fund of $50 million.  The Peacekeeping Reserve Fund, as of 29 
February 2004 stood at $74 million.32
Despite how beneficial PMCA was to the deployment of UNMIL and the Organization’s 
apparent resolve to guarantee its continuing existence, Member States want assurance that the 
authority will no be abused.  In the same resolution that authorized PMCA, the General 
Assembly provided checks against its hasty use as well.  Before the Secretary-General can spend 
money from the Peacekeeping Reserve Fund, he must still seek the approval of the ACABQ and 
must periodically submit to the General Assembly an account of how the funds have been used.  
The Secretary-General is also responsible for preparing a full account of all monies spent from 
the Peacekeeping Reserve Fund to prepare for a peacekeeping operation if the Security Council 
ultimately fails to sanction the mission. 
The mechanisms of the pre-mandate commitment authority are not adequate to allow the 
Secretary-General to secure all resources necessary for the start-up and deployment of a 
peacekeeping operation.  Some resources, such as military equipment and communication 
technology, are not readily available and require time to acquire and may entail a significant 
capital investment.  The mechanisms available as part of PMCA are not sufficient to cover such 
31
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32
 GA/AB/3607.
31
expenses; an alternative source of funding is required.  Member States and the UN must be 
willing to make a permanent investment in peacekeeping.
Strategic Deployment Stocks
Rapid deployment requires readily available equipment and resources.  The UN Logistics 
Base at Brindisi, Italy originally housed two peacekeeping start-up kits, which include all 
material resources necessary for the initial deployment of an operation, but the increase in the 
number of peacekeeping operations experienced in the early 1990’s had taxed the stocks at 
UNLB.  If UNLB was to continue to serve its purpose, it would have to receive greater and more 
regular funding under the UN budget.  The Brahimi Panel recommended that the General 
Assembly “authorize and approve a one-time expenditure for the creation of three new start -up 
kits at Brindisi (for a total of five), which would then automatically be replenished from the 
budgets of the missions that drew upon the kits.”33  Some Member States objected to the 
significant cost of acquiring three additional kits and maintaining a total of five start-up kits. As 
a result, the Secretary-General had to revise the Brahimi Panel’s recommendation and presented 
the General Assembly with three detailed alternatives for Strategic Deployment Stocks (SDS). 
The objections raised by Member States to financing the Strategic Deployment Stocks 
were similar to those raised over the pre-mandate commitment authority.  The Non-aligned 
movement and developing countries were again concerned with how financing the Strategic 
Deployment Stocks would affect the repayment of UN debts.  On behalf of the Pacific Islands 
Forum Group, Fiji brought attention to the large sums of money owed to a small number of 
troop-contributors by the United Nations for troop or contingent-owned equipment costs.  
Purchasing three additional mission start-up kits would delay repayment.  A representative from 
33
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Kenya informed the Special Political and Decolonization Committee that delaying the 
reimbursement of monies owed caused great hardship to troop- and equipment-contributing 
countries, especially to developing countries.  Cuba shared similar concerns with the other 
developing countries.34  Developed countries, though, which have much greater resources 
available to them, did not express the financial concerns of the developing countries.  In the 
conclusion of this paper will discuss the disparity of resources at greater length.  In general, 
Member States of high incomes favored increasing the resource at the United Nations Logistics 
Base.  On behalf of the European Union and associated States, Greece remarked that the United 
Nations Logistics Base played a crucial role in rapid deployment and therefore fully supported 
allocating the requested funds for the Strategic Deployment Stocks.35  Most Member States, 
though, favored an alternative to the large, one-time expenditure proposed by the Brahimi Panel 
and requested that the Secretary-General provide them with details plans for procuring 
equipment and maintaining the UNLB.
In his Report to the General Assembly on 1 June 2001, Secretary-General, Kofi Annan 
set forth three alternatives to the Panel’s recommendation for consideration.  The first was a 
"heavy strategic reserve" of equipment at the United Nations Logistics Base in Brindisi, Italy, 
which would require the pre-purchase and storage of nearly all the materials of the start-up kits 
and could entail an initial investment as high as $350 million.  The second suggestion in the 
report was for a "light strategic reserve" option, which would entail substantially lower up-front 
investments, estimated at $30 million, but would rely on extensive "retainer" contracts for the 
"just-in-time" delivery of goods and services and would incur very large annual costs, 
34
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hypothesized at over $100 million per annum.  And the third was a "medium strategic reserve" 
option, which attempts to keep the initial investment, costs and annual recurring costs at lower 
levels, with the initial investment at $170 million and the annual recurring costs at $40 million.
The Secretary-General’s report recommended the "medium strategic reserve" option as the most 
economical and practical choice.36
In the 164th meeting of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations on 19 June 
2001, the delegates took up the issue of augmenting the reserves at the United Nations Logistics 
Base in Brindisi, and the pre-commitment authority of the Secretary-General.  The Western 
Member States, overall, supported budgetary reform that sought to improve the rapid deployment 
of a mission and were willing to make the financial commitment to peacekeeping.  The 
representative from the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland, Stig Elevemar, expressed his 
support for PMCA.  He also conveyed his country’s support for progress toward a rapid 
deployment system and for the Brahimi Report as a whole, though he, as did most delegates, 
requested greater detail pertaining to the three options for equipment stocks necessary to achieve 
the proposed 30/90 days deployment time-lines.37
The Member States associated with the non-alignment movement did not feel that 
available funds should be spent on increasing the supplies at UNLB when the United Nations 
owed a large arrearage to troop-contributing states for past operations.  The delegation from 
Zambia made reference to the fact that UN debt owed to Member States that contributed troops 
to the mission in Sierra Leone alone amassed to $50 million.  Members of the non-aligned 
36
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movement expressed what could at best be considered a non-committal support for improving 
the rapid deployment system, and made it clear that no funds should be spent until the United 
Nations absolved its debt to Members that contributed troops and resources to past peacekeeping 
operations.38
Ultimately, the need for a strategic deployment stock was recognized, and a resolution 
endorsing a three-stage plan for implementation was adopted by the General Assembly, without 
a vote.39  The first step was to acquire sufficient supplies at United Nations Logistics Base to be 
able to rapidly deploy a headquarters for a traditional peacekeeping mission.  The General 
Assembly, in a resolution, endorsed “the concept and implementation of the strategic deployment 
stocks for one complex mission.”40  In this spirit, the General Assembly approved about US$140 
million for the strategic deployment stocks, taking into account the reserve at the UNLB at 
Brindisi, Italy, as of 30 April 2002 that meets the requirements of the strategic deployment 
stocks.41  By December 2002, the DPKO achieved the first significant milestone and promised to 
make considerable progress toward meeting its second goal, which was to be able to deploy the 
immediate operational capability required for a traditional peacekeeping mission.42
The second stage of the SDS plan was completed as of 31 December 2003.  The strategic 
stock facilitated the rapid deployment and operational readiness of the UN peacekeeping 
operations in Liberia and the Cote d’Ivoire, as well as the United Nations Monitoring, 
Verification and Inspection Commission and the Office of the Special Representative of the 
38
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Secretary-General in Iraq.43  The third stage is to acquire sufficient strategic deployment stock at 
UNLB to be able to deploy the immediate operational capacity required for both a tradition and a 
complex peacekeeping mission.  Although at this time the third stage of the plan has not been 
realized, UNLB continues to make progress toward a fully operational SDS.  
With the increase in funds available to the DPKO, there also came a call for greater 
accountability.  According to the terms of the same resolution that authorized SDS, the 
Secretary-General is required to make a detailed accounting to the General Assembly of all 
expenditures, and he must submit separate reports on the implementation of strategic deployment 
stocks and on the budget and performance of the UNLB.  General Assembly discussion on 
peacekeeping support accounts emphasized the importance of effective oversight and 
strengthening the management of the peacekeeping program, due in part to the enlarged UNLB 
support account.  Bob Jalango, who represented Kenya during a two-day debate on the need for 
the rapid deployment of United Nations peace operations, expressed concern over the 
Secretariat’s review of the practices used to procure equipment for a mission.  He hoped that the 
reforms would bring about greater ‘efficiency, propriety, accountability and transparency’ in the 
process.  But he also felt it was important that when procuring goods and services for 
peacekeeping operations priority should be given to developing countries, especially troop 
contributing countries in close proximity to the mission area.44
In addition to increasing the Secretary-General’s accountability, several Members 
favored an independent source of review.  They supported creating additional posts for the 
Investigations Division of the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) and apportioning the 
funds for the resident auditor posts from the support accounts, which had previously been funded 
43
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under individual peacekeeping mission budgets.45  Some felt that greater oversight would be 
necessary to avoid misuse of monies because they believed that the number of peacekeeping 
operations was declining.  Japan, for example, argued that the increase in support account for the 
UNLB would be hard to justify if the current trend in the decrease in the number of peace 
operations continued.  The ABACQ has also made a report drawing similar conclusions.46  Yet 
there is no reason to believe that this trend will continue; the UN has peacekeeping operations in 
Afghanistan, Haiti, and is preparing for a mission to Iraq.
Result-based budgeting is an additional precaution against the inappropriate use of funds.  
In the year 2000, the General Assembly authorized the Secretariat to start “results-based 
budgeting,” which established objectives for each department or program and defined 
“performance indicators” to measure the progress made toward them.  The Secretariat became 
responsible for “accomplishing missions” as opposed to simply “carrying out activities.47  The 
United States, Japan and the European Union are major proponents of result-based budgeting.48
Japanese representative Yukio Satoh remarked that “the new systems for determining scales of 
assessment, result-based budgeting, and progress in reforming human resources 
management…were particularly important for the administrative and budgetary reform of the 
Organization.”49  Under results-based budgeting, the ACABQ and General Assembly would 
require the Secretary-General to take into account the specific characteristics and mandates of 
each mission before submitting a budget proposal.  The budget must agree with the mandates of 
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the General Assembly and the proposal must contain all information Member States would need 
to reach a well-informed decision, “including full justification of required resources.”50
Peacekeeping Receives Some Respect
The Charter identifies the maintenance of international peace and security as a primary 
function of the United Nations, but in practice, especially in terms of financing, peace operations 
have not received priority.  Peacekeeping could be a more effective instrument for maintaining 
international peace and security if it were to receive the necessary funding.  The initial hesitation 
to the Brahimi Panel’s financial recommendations highlighted Member States’ attitude toward 
peacekeeping, but the Brahimi Report has brought about some positive change in their opinions.  
Progress has been made toward the budgetary and financial reform suggested by the Brahimi 
Report, although the national interests of Member States have had a substantial influence over 
the final outcome.  The Secretary-General has received pre-mandate commitment authority, and 
despite the staff’s initial confusion and unfamiliarity with the available mechanisms, PMCA has 
been established as a tool of DPKO.  But before Member States would grant the Secretariat 
fiduciary authority, they insisted that the Secretary-General be accountable to the General 
Assembly.  He still must seek the approval of the ACABQ before gaining access to the 
Peacekeeping Reserve Fund, and the Department of Peacekeeping has become subject to results-
based budgeting, under which DPKO stands to lose funding for the rapid deployment support 
accounts if sufficient progress is not made toward pre-determined indicators.  If reform does not 
prove to show sufficient “progress”, the General Assembly reserves the right to reduce or revoke 
funding.  But even with these out-clauses, the changes that have been made to the budget in 
favor of peacekeeping have created greater possibilities for the department.
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The recommendations by the Brahimi Panel discussed in this chapter concern financing 
and budgetary issues that would force a shift in the Organization’s priorities.  Member States 
have indicated that they are willing to recognize peacekeeping as a primary function of the 
United Nations by allocating a greater portion of the total budget for peacekeeping operations 
and allowing the Secretary-General greater flexibility in accessing and spending.  The next 
chapter will explore the Brahimi Panel’s concern for rapid deployment of resources through an 
examination of the attempt to strengthen the United Nations Standby Arrangements System 
(UNSAS) and the progress made toward establishing the On-Call List for military personnel and 
civilian police and personnel.  Rapid deployment is a crucial component of effective and 
efficient peacekeeping operations.  The successful establishment of the on-call list and a reliable 
UNSAS will go far toward making rapid deployment possible, but to do so, Member States will 
have to cooperate with the Secretariat and possibly surrender a small degree of sovereignty to the 
United Nations.
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Chapter III: The Rapid and Efficient Deployment of Troops
Not Just a Political Mark on the Wall
It cannot be denied that the availability of military force is necessary if the United 
Nations is to have a role in maintaining international peace and security.  According to Article 43 
of the Charter, the Security Council was to have an armed force provided by Member States for 
the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.  All Member States were to 
contribute to the force in accordance with individual agreements negotiated with the Military 
Staff Committee, which was created by the UN Charter to advise the Security Council in military 
matters.  In April of 1947, the Military Staff Committee produced a report describing the general 
principles that were to govern the organization of the United Nations armed forces, but 
disagreements persisted over certain details that were never settled due in part to the advent of 
the Cold War.  The members of the Security Council were unable to agree upon the standard by 
which the required size of the contribution of each Member State would be determined, the 
timeframe for deployment and withdrawal of troops, and the location of the training base.51
Cold War politics prevented the Security Council from taking decisive action on a 
number of issues.  When it became obvious that the situation in Korea required assistance, the 
United Nations had to find a way around the impasse in the Security Council, and the standard of 
voluntary contribution on an ad hoc basis was set.  Weakness and inconsistencies of the ad hoc 
system became apparent from the beginning.  Much time was wasted in the planning stages, and 
the deployment of missions was delayed as the Secretary-General scrambled to receive 
commitments from individual Member States once the Security Council issued the mandate for 
the operation.  Although many Member States have outright rejected the idea of a standing army 
51
 “Report by the Military Staff Committee,” 30 April 1947.
40
under the control of the United Nations, there exists a general consensus that a more reliable 
system of troop contribution is necessary.
UNSAS Substitute for Standing Army
The United Nations Standby Arrangement System (UNSAS) was first implemented in 
1994.  As part of UNSAS, Member States promise to contribute specified resources within an 
agreed timeframe to be used exclusively for UN peace operations authorized by the Security 
Council.  The UN and individual Member State negotiate pre-arranged terms for the commitment 
of operation resources.  According to the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), which 
outlines the terms of each arrangement, “The resources agreed upon remain on ‘standby’ in their 
home country, where necessary preparation, including training, is conducted to fulfill specified 
tasks or functions in accordance with United Nations guidelines.”  When needed, the Secretary 
General can request these resources, which are then rapidly deployed with the approval of the 
Member State.52  As part of the MOU, the Member States assume the responsibility for the costs 
incurred while troops are on ‘standby’ and are responsible for training personnel for 
peacekeeping duties.53
During the first six years, the system was not as widely embraced as hoped.  Both the 
number and quality of the troops ear-marked by Member States showed lackluster support for the 
Standby Arrangements System.  The Brahimi Report recommended that:
Member States should be encouraged, where appropriate, to enter into 
partnerships with one another, within the context of the United Nations Standby 
Arrangements System (UNSAS), to form several coherent brigade-size forces, 
with necessary enabling forces, ready for effective deployment within 30 days 
52
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of the adoption of a Security Council resolution establishing a traditional 
peacekeeping operation and within 90 days for complex peacekeeping 
operations.54
The Brahimi Panel was aware that there was general resistance among Member States to 
establishing a standing UN army or police force.  It was noted that some had avoided entering 
into reliable standby arrangements with the United Nations, and that Member States did not want 
to pay for the expenses of building a reserve of equipment.55  During a press conference 
following the release of the Brahimi Report, a reporter asked if it was realistic to expect Member 
States to approve the proposal to strengthen the UNSAS, given the system’s past performance.  
Brahimi responded that:
Member States had given the strong impression that they understood the 
Organization’s unique role, and realized that it should be helped to do better.  
While the idea of a United Nations army might not be a bad one, Member 
States did not want that.  The standby arrangements system was the next best 
thing.56
Consistent with the intent of the report, the Brahimi Panel did not strive for the optimal outcome; 
the recommendation was realistic and obtainable in scope and was meant to achieve the best 
available solution to a problem.  A genuine commitment to the UN Standby Arrangements 
System would be easier to achieve than a UN army, yet would still make it possible to deploy a 
mission within the 30-90 day timeframe. 
Almost a year following the release of the Brahimi Report, Member States and the 
Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations had mixed reactions to the recommendation to 
strengthen the existing UNSAS.  They recognized the benefit of rapid and efficient deployment, 
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and most Member States agreed that an effort should be made toward this end, but they could not 
agree on how to go about doing so.  Developed countries, in general, responded favorably to the 
recommendation to strengthen UNSAS, but low-income countries once again raised the issues of 
finance, necessity and ethics.
Cameron Hume, speaking on behalf of the United States during a meeting of the Special 
Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, made a to-the-point statement concerning UNSAS: “If 
we want the 30-90 day standard to be more than a political mark on the wall, Member States will 
have to contribute as conscientiously as they can to the standby arrangements, as well as 
resources for pre-positioned equipment of some scale.”57  Substantial commitment has been 
made since 2001 toward securing pre-positioned equipment.  As discussed in Chapter Two the 
United Nations Logistical Base has developed the capability to deploy the resources needed for 
one complex mission within the 30-90 day standard and is making advances toward the goal of 
having the ability to deploy one complex and one traditional peacekeeping operation per year.  
Progress has been less substantial in the area of the UNSAS.  Although Member States have 
been willing to support the effort, verbally and in writing, active participation is the exception 
rather than the norm.  Even the most active Member States have limited their participation to 
their discretion.
Officially, the UN has endorsed proposals to strengthen the Standby Arrangements 
System and make it more relevant.  The Special Committee on Peacekeeping has called on the 
“Secretary General to formally canvass the Member States participating in the United Nations 
Standby Arrangements System regarding their willingness to contribute troops to a potential 
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operation once it appears likely that the United Nations might have an implementing role.”58  In 
speech, many Member States have been supportive of reforming the UNSAS to make the system 
more constructive.  Argentina has voiced its support for strengthening the system and stressed 
the importance of fostering the political will of Member States to cooperate with the United 
Nations in this endeavor.  Indonesia and Byelorussia have also attached great importance to the 
system, and Turkey claimed to take a leadership role in establishing a more permanent 
peacekeeping structure.  The Republic of Korea pledged in 2001 to increase the size of its 
standby force.59  Some Member States have cautioned against relying on the UNSAS.  Uruguay 
would not support creating a standby brigade-strength regional force for UN use; it is concerned 
that Member States may not be willing to bare the cost of maintaining such a force, as well as the 
fact that troop deployment is still conditional on the ad hoc approval of the home state.60
Actual enrollment in the system has been limited, accounting for less than forty-two 
percent of Member States.  As of the release of the last status report issued by DPKO, in July 
2003, eighty Member States have joined the Standby Arrangements System and met at least the 
requirements for level one.61  The system has four levels: the first level requires Member States 
to submit a “List of Capabilities,” which describes what resources, including troops and 
equipment the Member State would make available to the Security Council for use exclusively in 
peace operations, along with response times and restrictions.  The second level requires the 
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submission of “Planning Data Sheets,” which is a detailed list describing the contribution; this 
level is essential to the Secretariat’s ability to plan for potential shortcomings in resources 
available.  Ten Member States are currently at the second level and have submitted Planning 
Data Sheets to the Secretariat.  The third level of UNSAS requires a real commitment from 
Member States, who sign a general Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the Secretary-
General at this time.  In the MOU, the Member State specifies what resources they will provide 
for a mission, the timeframe in which the materials will be available for deployment and 
conditions of use; the MOU is a formal document that includes technical data and restrictions on 
resources.62  Forty-five Member States have signed Memorandums of Understanding with the 
UN.  Many participants of UNSAS have yet to reach this level of commitment; the United States, 
which joined the system in 1994, has yet to sign a Memorandum of Understanding and remains 
at level one.  Two Member States, Jordan and Uruguay, though, have assumed a significant 
degree of commitment to UNSAS by joining the new Rapid Deployment Level, which went into 
effect on 25 July 2002.63  As participants in the Rapid Deployment Level, Member States sign a 
specific MOU and agree to make the resources commitment to UNSAS available for deployment 
within 30-90 days after the adoption of a Security Council resolution.  Level-four status also 
requires representatives of the Secretariat to visit the Member State to confirm that the promised 
resources are available and meet the specifications.  But similar to the original system, resources 
can only be deployed following appropriate governmental approval.64
Perhaps more important than the numbers is the quality of the troops contributed by 
Member States.  Missions in the 1990s, at times, received bodies as opposed to peacekeepers.  
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Some Member States sent ill equipped and/or ill-trained soldiers, forcing troops from other 
Member States, or the United Nations, to compensate for the inadequacies:
Soldiers without rifles, or with rifles but no helmets, or with helmets but no flak 
jackets, or with no organic transport capability (trucks or troops carriers).  
Troops may be untrained in peacekeeping operations and… some units have no 
personnel who can speak the mission language.65
Such troops are a greater liability than asset to a mission, and the Brahimi Report argues that:
Troop-contributing countries that cannot meet the terms or their memoranda of 
understanding should so indicate to the United Nations, and must not deploy.  
To that end, the Secretary-General should be given the resources and support 
needed to assess potential troop contributors’ preparedness prior to deployment, 
and to confirm that the provisions of the memoranda will be met.66
The issue becomes more pressing as an increasing percentage of troop-contributing countries are 
developing states. 
Eighteen months after the General Assembly ‘took note’ of the Brahimi Report and the 
Security Council ‘endorsed’ the enhancement of the UN Standby Arrangements System, troops 
contributed by some Member States were still under-qualified and improperly equipped for the 
missions to which they had been deployed.  Jean-Marie Guehenno, the Under Secretary-General 
for Peacekeeping Operations expressed his disappointment in the lack of cooperation and 
commitment shown by Member States to the success of the system.  When addressing the 
General Assembly, he made a pointed assessment of the progress made toward improving the 
UNSAS:
We need Member States to assure us that the human resources they offer are 
not only suitable to the task, but also meet appropriate standards…I [have] 
emphasized the need for the Secretariat to have accurate data, if UNSAS is to 
be useful in rapid deployment.  We have instituted a regime of quarterly 
reporting to ensure accurate data.  Despite these efforts, the response so far, I 
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regret to say, has not been adequate.  As at 31 January (the due date of the first 
report), only 21 Member States have provided updates.  We can only assume 
that those who have not done so are not active in the system.  On the basis of 
the present reporting, a total of 44,000 troops are available in UNSAS.  This is 
a significant decrease.  Previously, about 147,000 troops were declared 
available.  We will continue this reporting regime, and I hope to be able to 
report more positively in my annual report at the end of this year.67
Since its introduction in 1994, UNSAS has provided support for operations in Angola, 
Cote d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia-Eritrea, Haiti, Liberia, Central Africa 
Republic, Sierra Leone, Lebanon and Western Sahara.  The United Nations mission to Haiti, 
UNMIH, drew nearly seventy-five percent of its personnel from the standby arrangements 
database.68  The system will also be called upon to assist in the deployment of the United Nations 
operation to Iraq in the near future, suspected to commence in 2004.
On-Call List Exists in Writing
Another aspect to reforming the United Nations Standby Arrangement System is the 
establishment of a personnel “On-Call List.”  Advances have been made towards fulfilling the 
Brahimi Report recommendation for the On-Call List of key civilian and military personnel 
necessary for the start-up and the continued success of a peacekeeping operation.  The Military 
Division of the DPKO has identified 154 positions for which an On-Call List is to be compiled, 
of which nine posts have been identified as part of the ‘Core Planning Element.’  Qualified 
personnel who can be ready to fill any position of the Core Planning Element within seven days 
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notice, as well as a list of qualified persons who can be prepared to fill the remaining positions 
on the list within fourteen days of notice are nominated by individual Member States.
The Civilian Police Division has completed the design for a model civilian police 
headquarters that consists of 100 positions and has provided comprehensive job descriptions for 
each post.  Because not all personnel are needed at all times nor can all of the posts be introduced 
at the same time during the mission, the list has been divided into three stages of development.  
The Personnel Management and Support Service has also created an On-Call List of 110
specialized posts required for the start-up phase of a field mission.  This staff is to be available to 
fill the posts on 96-hours notice and can remain in the field for up to three months.69
Genuine support for and commitment to the on-call list does exist.  Member States 
ranging from the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland to China and Bangladesh have indicated 
their support for the recommendation through official channels.70  In October 2002, India went as 
far as to pledge a brigade and 60 officers to the On-Call List.71  But not all Member States fully 
support the system, and concern has been expressed over the equitable geographical and gender 
distribution of the personnel included on the list.  
The Non-Aligned Movement in particular is concerned that the on-call list is 
misrepresentative of geographical and gender distributions.  These countries resent what they 
feel is a gross inequality between the numbers of troops contributed by developing countries and 
the number of commanders that also come from this part of the world.  Speaking on behalf of the 
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Nonaligned Movement, Jordanian Ambassador Zeid Ra'ad Zeid al-Hussein said the three top 
military posts in a mission should go to contributing states, adding that:
No force commander or senior officer, whatever their competence, should be 
appointed to a mission where his or her country is not making a sizeable 
contribution in the form of troops.  We certainly do not want to see a situation 
where the industrialized world begins to supply the commanders while [we], 
in the developing world, only supply the commanded.72
Equal representation is a significant concern to the Non-Aligned Movement as they 
struggle to establish their influence in international relations.
Other members of the Non-Aligned Movement have expressed similar concerns about 
inequitable distribution of control.  Masood Khalid, Pakistani representative, noted that there was 
still a gap between the views of DPKO and those of several Member States on the On-Call Lists, 
and that many troop-contributing countries remained severely under-represented at UN 
Headquarters.73  Representative from Singapore, Yap Ong Heng, was wary of the current method 
used to fill the positions of the on-call lists, saying that many Member States have had difficulty 
nominating personnel for the specific posts, especially developing countries.  He recommended 
establishing a training center to which personnel could be sent to acquire the skills necessary to 
fulfill the duties of each post, so there is no inequitable or uneven treatment for developed and 
developing regions.74  In response to the concerns over geographical representation in 
recruitment, Guehenno noted that it is the Department’s foremost obligation to identify the most 
qualified candidate for the position.75
With regard to military and police on-call lists, results have been varied.  At the close of 
2003, thirty-nine Member States had nominated a total of 668 personnel for the 147 positions on 
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the military on-call list.  Other Member States have indicated that they are willing to nominate 
qualified personnel on an as-need basis.  The system has been used to establish the mission 
headquarters for UN operations in Liberia and Cote d’Ivoire, but it has yet to meet desired 
response times, and there as been a lack of familiarity among the personnel with UN practices 
and procedures.  The civilian police list has received very few nominations; only nine countries, 
at the time of the report, had pledged personnel to fill the posts.  With the demand increasing for 
civilian police officers as UN peace operation progress, the Secretariat urges Member States to 
participate in the mechanisms established to achieve effective and rapid deployment.76
The Secretariat has had some success in employing the on-call lists.  The rapid 
deployment of civilian personnel has been used to place experienced staff on the ground quickly 
for the start-up of a mission.  The rapid deployment team mechanism has allowed forty-four 
Department of Peacekeeping Operations staff, mostly in UNMIL, to be deployed to the mission 
efficiently and effectively.  The entire mission support component of UNMIL was also 
established quickly utilizing the mechanism.77
Although some progress has been made toward strengthening the UNSAS and filling the 
posts on the on-call lists with qualified personnel, they remain inadequate sources to staff an 
entire peacekeeping operation.  Member States frequently fail to take interest in missions that do 
not directly affect their national interests.  Many view conflicts in which the United Nations has 
involved itself as regional issues to be dealt with by regional organizations.  Such sentiments 
encourage Member States to refuse the Secretary-General’s request for troops and resources, 
possibly employing the out-clause contained in their MOU if they participate in the UNSAS.  As 
a result, the UN has looked toward regional organizations and multinational forces to supply 
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personnel for Security Council sanctioned peacekeeping missions.  Member States seem to 
embrace this alternative to deploying blue helmets, but certain staff of the Secretariat would 
rather UN conduct peacekeeping operations with UN peacekeeping troops.
The Regional Force Alternative
Despite the reforms made in the Standby Arrangements System, regional organizations 
and multinational forces have received increasing support in recent years.  There has emerged an 
informal consensus that peace operations are a regional concern as opposed to an issue of 
international peace and security and are therefore not a matter for the United Nations, citing the 
provision in the UN Charter for the primacy of regional dispute-settling mechanisms.78  The 
Charter states that such regional organizations shall partake in enforcement actions under the 
authority of the Security Council; this is not always the circumstance.  While non-UN 
peacekeepers have played a significant role in several peacekeeping efforts, in other missions the 
presence of independent troops has proven disastrous.  Yet enthusiasm for an alternative to 
deploying blue helmets continues to grow.
The term regional organization refers to a variety of bodies, formed on a geographic 
basis, that may deploy peacekeepers with or without authorization from the Security Council, 
and operate independently of the authority of the Secretariat.  Multinational forces refer to ad-
hoc alliances created to deal with the particular conflict.  Many multinational forces have a ‘lead 
nation,’ and frequently use force to bring about an end to conflict.  These forces, as well, may be 
deployed with or without authorization of the Security Council, and operate freely from the 
management of the Secretariat. 
Consent, a necessary component for the success of a traditional peacekeeping operation, 
may be easier to obtain if the peacekeeper are sent on behalf of a regional organization.  Forces 
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sent by regional organizations are more likely to be familiar with the customs and traditions of 
the local population; the greater the similarities in cultural ideals and physical appearance, the 
more likely the people are to welcome the peacekeepers and pacify any feelings of intrusion.  
The troops themselves may be more homogenous, better trained and equipped, and operate more 
efficiently because they will likely share a language and have strong political motivations in 
seeing the mission succeed.
Yet this is frequently not the circumstance.  Most regional organizations and 
multinational forces do not have the capacity of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or 
the European Union.  Many regional organizations and multinational forces are comprised of 
developing countries that lack the finances and resources to properly train and adequately equip 
their troops and personnel.  Even when the resources are available, such forces are not as 
politically cohesive as desired, and these forces may be prevented from taking action due to 
conflict in political interests, very similar to the political difficulties that have prevented the 
Security Council from taking action.79
Financial difficulty is not the only obstacle facing multinational forces and regional 
organizations.  When the resources are available, problems with chain of command have resulted 
in casualties during United Nations peace operations in which both non-United Nations and blue 
helmet peacekeepers have been deployed.  Both the missions in Bosnia, UNPROFOR, and 
Somalia, UNOSOM and UNITAF, experienced difficulties associated with having multiple 
chains of command.  In UNPROFOR, NATO operated along side the UN peacekeepers; both the 
forces were responsible to separate commanders and received orders independent of each other.  
NATO had command over the air strikes, while the Secretary-General managed the peacekeepers 
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on the ground.  Coordinating efforts proved to be difficult at times.  Similar problems with 
coordinating efforts plagued UNOSOM and UNITAF, or United Task Force, which was 
comprised of troops from over twenty countries, primarily the United States.  UNITAF was 
sanctioned by the Security Council at the suggestion of the United States, but remained outside 
the command of the Secretary-General.  The fractured command structure intensified the 
seriousness of the implications of the U.S. Ranger’s black hawk helicopter being shot down by 
supporters of General Mohamed Farah Aidid.  As a result, the United States withdrew its troops 
and support from Somalia.80
Multinational forces and regional organizations are growing in number and size.  NATO, 
for example, admitted seven new members on 2 April 2004.  The induction Bulgaria, Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia was the largest expansion of the alliance in 
its 55-years of existence.81  The regional organization of the Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS) has been sending soldiers from its member states to intervene in 
regional crises since 1990.  The troops of ECOWAS will soon join the ranks of the African 
Union Force, which leaders hope will begin operations sometime in 2005, and be fully 
operational by 2010.  The African Standby Force will be comprised of brigades originating from 
north, west, east, south and central Africa.  Intervention will take place on humanitarian and 
peace-building grounds, as well as in cases of genocide and serious threats to legitimate order. 
An African body modeled on the UN Security Council will have the sole authority to deploy, 
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manage and terminate the force’s missions. It has already sent peacekeeping troops to Burundi, 
but the mission has been plagued by financial problems.82
Julian Hartson, Director of the Middle East and Asian division of the United Nations 
Department of Peacekeeping Operations, argues that delegating UN authority to organizations 
that do not fall under the operational control of the United Nations could potentially undermine 
the standing of a Security Council mandate, as could suggestions that conflicts are addressed 
according to a de facto class system, whereby high interest by major powers translates into 
engagement of NATO, or multinational forces; moderate interest leads to the use of United 
Nations operations; and low interest leads to delegation to other regional organizations. Regular 
reliance upon regional or multinational forces activities in one part of the world is likely to beget 
imitation in another, and ultimately is likely to favor the development of competing spheres of 
influence.83
Deployment of peacekeeping operations under the flag of the United Nations may pose 
fewer problems than those encountered when operations are composed of multiple flags with 
different objectives.  UNSAS offers a legitimate alternative to a standing UN army.  The pro-
rated pay scale used to finance missions and compensate personnel guarantees that the troops 
from developing countries are not at a disadvantage.  Because troops are paid by the United 
Nations and not by the individual country that contributed the personnel, troops from developing 
countries, in general, are compensated at a higher rate than they would be if employed by their 
home country.  Centers to train volunteers for the posts included on the military and civilian on-
call lists would ensure a familiarity with UN procedure and practice and eliminate another 
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disadvantage frequently cited by developing countries.  Because UN peacekeeping was founded 
on the principle of impartiality and based on mutual consent, blue helmet troops are less likely to 
have ulterior political motives; their ultimate objective is peace.
This chapter examined the progress made toward achieving rapid and efficient 
deployment of a peacekeeping operation, without which it is difficult for missions to be 
effective.  The Brahimi Report recommended that the United Nations Standby Arrangements 
System be enhanced through securing more dependable and realistic Memorandums of 
Understandings from Member States, and that the Department of Peacekeeping Operations 
establish an On-Call List for military personnel, as well as civilian personnel and police to which 
Member States appoint qualified persons.  Although an increasing number of Member States 
have joined the UNSAS, they represent less than half of the members of United Nations, and just 
over half of these countries have signed MOU.  The On-Call Lists have been established, and 
sufficient persons have been nominated to fill each post, but some Member States contend the 
lists may not be equitably representative geographically and in terms of gender.  Although 
neither mechanism has reached its potential envisioned by the Brahimi Report, both mechanisms 
are operational and have been successfully employed in recent peacekeeping missions. 
Chapter Four addresses the controversy that accompanied the suggestion that the United 
Nations establish a fine-tuned intelligence agency to fulfill the information and strategic analysis 
needs of the Executive Committee on Peace and Security (ECPS).  Referred to as the ECPS 
Information and Strategic Analysis System (EISAS) in the Brahimi Report, its objective is to 
equip the United Nations with the capacity to anticipate potential areas of conflict, making early 
intervention possible.  This effort would require the cooperation of multiple entities within the 
Secretariat as well as the consent of Member States.  EISAS represents the third category of 
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fundamental reform identified by the Brahimi Report as necessary for the DPKO; the Secretariat 
would have to undergo organizational and structural reform far beyond that assumed during the 
first series of reforms initiated by Secretary-General Kofi Annan in 1997.  This level of 
reorganization would prove that the UN has the ability to adapt to ever-changing international 
political relations.  But reform has encountered difficulties originating from both inside the 
Organization and Member States.  
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Chapter IV: Enhancing the Intelligence Capability of the United Nations:
Requires Internal Determination
The reform that this chapter discusses is fundamentally different from reforms discussed 
in the previous chapters.  First, establishing the Executive Committee on Peace and Security 
Information and Strategic Analysis System (EISAS) requires creating something new, as 
opposed to enhancing an existing mechanism of the United Nations.  The UNSAS, the logistic 
base in Brindisi, Italy, and the Peacekeeping Reserve Fund existed before the Panel on United 
Nations Peace Operations issued their report.  Secondly, these reforms will require cooperation 
of both Member States and the individual departments of the Secretariat.  The importance of 
interdepartmental cooperation has been recognized both within the Secretariat and by Member 
States, but it has proven difficult to achieve.  Both Member States and staff have show hesitation 
to proceed with the recommendation for the EISAS, but for very different reasons.  Currently 
very little has been done to create the proposed cross-departmental intelligence agency.
EISAS: The Vision
The Brahimi Panel proposed a new information-gathering and strategic planning unit be 
created to support the informational and strategic analysis needs of the Secretariat and the 
members of the Executive Committee on Peace and Security (ECPS), which was established 
during the 1997 reforms.  In January 1997, the Secretary-General initiated institutional reforms 
throughout the Secretariat, which reorganized the management of the Secretariat’s 
responsibilities around the five areas that comprise the core missions of the United Nation.  The 
organization and structure of all UN departments, programs and funds were effected.  Five 
Executive Committees were designed as instruments of policy development, decision-making 
57
and management; peace and security issues became the responsibility of the ECPS.84   It was 
feared that without such an entity, the Secretariat would never progress beyond a reactive 
institution, unable to become a truly effective tool in maintaining international peace and 
security, and the ECPS will not fulfill the role for which it was created. 85
The EISAS of the Brahimi Report would be the focal point of the United Nation’s 
conflict prevention capability.  Its primary function would be to create and maintain an 
integrated database pertaining to issues of peace and security and to distribute that knowledge 
efficiently to the appropriate organs of the UN.  The knowledge the unit obtained would also be 
used to generate policy analysis for the DPKO, formulate long-term strategies for the ECPS, and 
bring potential crises to the attention of its leadership.  It would also propose and manage the 
agenda of ECPS itself, helping transform it into the decision-making body conceived of by the 
Secretary-General in his 1997 reform package.
Attempting to utilize existing UN resources and structures to meet its ends, the Brahimi 
Panel recommended consolidating the existing Situation Center of the DPKO with a number of 
the small, uncoordinated policy planning offices, combined with a small team of military 
analysts, experts in international criminal networks and information systems specialists.86  Annan 
argued in favor of establishing the EISAS as a facilitator of information sharing, cooperation and 
coordination among the departments of the Secretariat.  
This structure would allow much better use of the wealth of information 
already existing within the United Nations system and in open public sources. 
It would ensure that the humanitarian and development perspective is part of 
the strategic analysis work and of the mission planning process.  It would 
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facilitate better cooperation and coordination between the Department of 
Political Affairs, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and other parts 
of the system, as called for by Member States.  It would provide analytical 
support for the formulation by the system of policy options and medium- to 
long-term strategies of a crosscutting nature, which increasingly require a 
multidisciplinary approach.  And, finally, it would help move the 
Organization to a point where, in close collaboration with the Member States 
concerned, it is able to better analyze, and target its resources at, the root 
causes of potential conflicts. Surely, we can all agree on the importance of this 
service.87
In sum, EISAS would create a more efficient UN Headquarters, by providing a single source for 
information from which the entire Secretariat could draw.  It would eliminate the unnecessary 
expenditure of resources by multiple departments working on the same or similar projects due to 
lack of coordination.  EISAS would be a fine-tuned intelligence agency that could be a valuable 
asset to United Nations peacekeeping operations. 
EISAS: The Controversy
On the record, the initial reaction of Member States to EISAS was positive.  In resolution 
1327 (2000), the Security Council endorsed the Secretary-General’s proposal for EISAS as set 
forth in S/2000/1081.  In a later resolution, the Security Council acknowledged the advantages to 
peacekeeping if the Secretariat had such intelligence and analytical capabilities:
8. The Security Council reiterates that the Secretary-General should possess 
the capacity for efficient information gathering and analysis to provide 
credible, objective analyses and sound advice to support the Council’s 
deliberations during mandate formation, periodic or episodic review of a 
mandate and consideration of withdrawal of a mission.88
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But the language employed by the Security Council is weak; the resolution simply endorses the 
suggestions made by the Brahimi Report.  None of the terms of the resolutions passed by the 
Security Council require action to be taken by either Member States or the United Nations.  The 
Security Council restrained itself to only voicing its approval of the idea.
The EISAS was subject to a wide variety of praise and criticism, similar to that which 
was expressed during debate over other aspects of the Brahimi Report.  The developed countries 
that are traditionally active in peacekeeping operations came out as the strongest advocates of the 
system; the developing countries were much more critical of the proposal.  Early on it became 
evident that the fate of EISAS would not be an easy decision.  The Secretary-General has been 
quoted saying, “One area where we seem to have run into some controversy is this whole area of 
information, if you need to set up a unit, you have to gather information for planning purposes to 
be able to anticipate. And so we're going to have to do quite a bit of convincing on that aspect.”89
But despite all the obvious benefits EISAS would bring to the United Nations, some Member 
States were not convinced.
For the most part, developed states supported the EISAS.  They realized the value of a 
modern intelligence agency to DPKO and the UN.  The Canadian delegation, which is a strong 
proponent of strengthening the DPKO, wants to eliminate macro-management by reinforcing the 
management and planning functions of the department.  Canada is adamant on granting the 
Secretary-General information-gathering, analysis and dissemination capabilities.  To be 
effective in the ever-changing international political environment, the DPKO needs the ability to 
anticipate and prepare for possible conflicts; Canada is committed to realizing this goal.   Stig 
Elvemar, a representative of the European Union, supports strengthening the logistic planning 
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and support abilities of the DPKO.  The European Union backed the Brahimi Report proposal for 
a new system-wide policy and information analysis system.  Russia has also found it important to 
strengthen the information and analytical capacity of the Organization,90 and the Rio-Group91
maintains that establishing a special organ for the compilation of data and analysis of 
information is of extreme importance to the success of peacekeeping.92
In general, a majority of Member States are not as zealous as Canada to grant the 
Secretary-General and DPKO unlimited authority.  Many acknowledge the need to process and 
analyze information, but would prefer a less powerful alternative to the EISAS of the Brahimi 
Report.  Egypt has been supportive of the United Nations developing the capacity for strategic 
planning and information analysis.  It favors creating an independent information gathering and 
analysis unit for areas and situations in which the United Nations is involved.  But Egypt is wary 
of granting the UN the authority to gather information on areas where the Organization is not 
formally involved.  Classifying unrestricted intelligence as a delicate issue, they have asked for a 
clear definition of the term ‘analysis’, which would allay their concerns about abuse of the 
proposed capacity.  Pakistan has also asked that clear and precise terms of reference for the 
proposed unit be presented to the Special Committee of Peacekeeping Operations.93
Furthermore, Nepal agreed the Secretary-General needs a system-wide analysis unit to process 
and analyze information, but believed that EISAS would be problematic for both Member States 
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and the Secretariat because to collect the information it requires creating a new bureaucracy, or 
substantially expanding an existing one.94
Some Member States are more hostile to the idea of allowing the UN extensive 
intelligence capabilities.  The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) is concerned with maintaining the 
balance of power within the United Nations.  Its members insist on commitment to decision 
making based on consent and to the settlement of disputes, when ever possible, through non-
force mechanisms.  When discussing the possibility of creating EISAS, the countries that 
identify themselves as the non-aligned movement worry about the attention given to the idea of 
strategic planning.  Some NAM countries want the analysis and logistics division separated into 
two independent units because they are concerned with possible abuse of the proposed capacity 
for strategic planning.  These Member States are also uncomfortable with the fact that there is no 
timeframe attached to the definition of the division’s intended purpose of long-term analysis.  
They fear that if specific parameters are not defined, the UN will be more likely to over step its 
bounds and abuse the power.  Other countries argued that the United Nations currently has in 
existence entities with such capabilities, so there is no real need for an additional intelligence 
division of the DPKO.  South Africa demanded that the need to transform the Best Practices Unit 
into the Peacekeeping Strategic Planning Unit be clarified, because it was unconvinced by the 
claims made by the Brahimi Panel.  Algeria, in association with the non-aligned movement, has 
pointed out that the Department of Political Affairs and the Department of Public Information 
already perform some of the information analysis called for by the Brahimi Report.95
Delaying the establishment of EISAS has also received substantial support from both 
Member States and within the Organization.  The ACABQ recommended that the unit not be 
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established at that time until further examination of the management structure was conducted 
because it wanted a clarification of the intricacies of the system.  Russia supported the advice of 
the ACABQ, agreeing that additional information would be beneficial before endorsing EISAS.96
The Indian delegation criticized the Brahimi Report, arguing that the creation of EISAS would 
not make “a lot of difference to a peacekeeping operation” or the peacekeepers involved.  While 
they were open to the Strategic Planning Unit, the Indian delegation did not believe that the more 
powerful analytical brain of EISAS was necessary and favored delaying serious deliberation over 
the EISAS because it was not an issue of emergency.97
While there is some validity to the claims that the capacity for information analysis exists 
to a certain degree in the existing divisions of the Secretariat, very little cooperation exists 
between these divisions, and, even when viewed in its entirety, the Secretariat does not have near 
the intelligence and analytical capacity that would be achieved through the creation of EISAS.  
In attempt to gain some progress, the Secretary-General, in a report to the General Assembly, 
proposed a scaled-down version of the EISAS presented in the Brahimi Report.  The revised 
version was fashioned to take into account some of the concerns expressed by the Member 
States; it focused more on strengthening the capacity of the ECPS by enhancing the information 
capacity of DPKO, the Department of Political Affairs and the Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs.  The revised EISAS did not include the cartographic office or the media 
monitoring capabilities that the Brahimi Panel conceived for the system, and the revised proposal 
placed a heavier burden on the Department of Public Information to fulfill the responsibility of 
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gathering information.98  The conclusion of this paper will attempt to clarify the underlying 
reasons why Member States object to aspects of EISAS.
Internal Barriers to Reform
The fate of EISAS has largely been a product of political pressure from Member States, 
but United Nations personnel have also had an effect.  While some Member States are concerned 
with abuse of power and the misuse of resources, a majority support improving coordination and 
cooperation among the relevant departments of the Secretariat.  The Secretariat staff, however, is 
concerned with the effort required for coordinating the work of various departments.  
In an informal conversation, the Senior Political Affairs Office for the Asia and Middle 
East division of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Mary Eliza Kimball remarked on 
the difficulty of accomplishing interdepartmental cooperation.  She said that the difficulties 
surrounding the EISAS went beyond the lack of political will of the Member States to the lack of 
will of the staff members of the United Nations, because it required coordinating the separate 
entities of the Secretariat.  She noted that even members of the Brahimi Panel were skeptical of 
successfully organizing such interdepartmental meetings.  They themselves were not enthusiastic 
about devoting the time and effort necessary to make such cooperation possible; it imposes yet 
another duty on the already over-extended and understaffed departments of the Secretariat.99
In a report released in February 2004, the United States General Accounting Office 
(GAO) identified four major factors impeding full implementation of United Nations reform 
proposed in 1997 and by the Brahimi Report.  One of them was the reluctance of UN managers, 
who resisted implementing certain reforms.  Yet managerial support is critical for the 
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institutionalization of reforms in the long term.  When the GAO interviewed UN managers, the 
typical response was that the departments lacked the resources to support regular monitoring and 
evaluation exercises required for the reform, and that these evaluation requirements would 
detract time and money from the department’s primary responsibilities.  Despite managerial 
resistance, the report did conclude that lack of cooperation from Member States was a greater 
impediment to reform than that posed by the management and that reform under the Secretary-
General advanced faster than that under the authority of Member States.100
Responsibilities Intended for One Unit Spread Among Many
After subsequent proposals meant to enhance the intelligence capabilities of the United 
Nations, discussion concerning the establishment of one organ within the Organization that 
remotely resembles EISAS has ceased.  Under Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations 
Jean-Marie Guehenno has said that the revisions to the system were made to reflect the concerns 
of the Member States.101  Rather than one agency within the Secretariat whose main purpose is 
intelligence gathering and analysis, the responsibilities of the EISAS that received the least 
criticism were divided among separate units of the Secretariat.  The focus shifted from creating a 
new unit in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations to ensuring the best use of the existing 
resources.  Efforts have been made to improve the effectiveness of the Best Practices Unit in the 
Department of Peacekeeping, the Department of Political Affairs, the Department of Public 
Information and the Situation Center.
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The potential policy analysis capability of the Best Practices Unit of the Department of 
Peacekeeping has received substantial attention.  It is hoped that the unit will prove to be a useful 
tool in the planning and management of peacekeeping operations.102  Using information gathered 
during previous peacekeeping operations and conflicts in which the United Nations was 
involved, the Best Practices Unit is expected to make policy recommendations for conducting 
future missions.  The unit is to judge whether past efforts were effective and base its conclusions 
on this analysis.  The Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations envisioned that:
The Unit needs to be able to develop generic guidelines, procedures and best 
practices and to incorporate lessons learned into all aspects of today’s 
peacekeeping operations. The Unit should have the capacity to mainstream 
best practices into the planning of new operations, provide feedback to 
missions in the field, interact effectively with other entities within the 
Department and with other relevant parts of the Secretariat and continue to 
participate as appropriate in integrated mission task forces.103
In an attempt to honor the recommendations of the Brahimi Panel to streamline the Secretariat 
and increase efficiency by preventing efforts of individual departments from overlapping, the 
Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations stated in its report of 11 March 2002, that for no 
reason is the Best Practices Unit to duplicate the work done by other departments of the United 
Nations, and the Committee also called for the Best Practices Unit to be renamed to better reflect 
its responsibilities.104
Currently, the Best Practices Unit resembles the organ described by the Special 
Committee on Peacekeeping Operations.  It has a staff of 14 personnel, ten of which are funded 
through the DPKO support account and four of which are included in the DPKO regular budget.  
The unit is responsible for coordinating the assessment of United Nations peacekeeping 
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experiences, keeping detailed records of the procedures followed during a mission and the 
results.  The Best Practices Unit is called upon to conduct lessons learned exercises, including a 
series of ‘After Action Reports,’ which are to stimulate informed discussion of current issues in 
peacekeeping.  One report, for example, discussed the extent to which the existing pre-mandate 
commitment authority mechanisms were adequate to meet the future needs of DPKO, in light of 
MINUCI.  The Unit also evaluates the successes and failures of a mission to determine which 
practices are effective.  From this analysis of best practices and lessons learned during a mission, 
the unit tries to establish guidelines and make recommendations for better planning, conduct, 
management and support of peacekeeping operations.105  Thus, in 2002, the Best Practices Unit 
began preparing a manual for multi-dimensional peacekeeping.  The manual is a compilation of 
policy and operational information, as well as guidelines and standard operating procedures.
In the same report of 11 March 2002, the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations 
outlined the responsibilities of the Situation Center.  The center has been assigned the 
responsibility of gathering information and monitoring current situations.  It serves as a point of 
contact and a constant communication link between the field and Headquarters through the life 
of a peacekeeping operation.  It also functions as a monitoring mechanism, though it is limited to 
present peacekeeping mission areas, and situations and security threats that have been identified 
as such by the United Nations.  The center is not permitted to survey areas in which other UN 
organs are not involved.  After gathering the appropriate information about the monitored areas, 
it provides daily situation reports and situation briefings to other UN organs.  Because the center 
is responsible for monitoring all peacekeeping operations, it also has the duty of notifying 
Member States of casualties incurred during a mission.  Because it is the best single source of 
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information on current missions, when necessary, it functions as a crisis center for the crisis 
management team.106
Despite the current state of hibernation the discussion of EISAS has assumed, the quest to 
augment the intelligence and strategic planning capabilities of the Secretariat has not been 
abandoned.  There is an active effort to plug into information and analysis providers beyond the 
Organization, especially an increasing number of think tanks located in New York City.  When it 
became apparent that instituting EISAS was not immediately possible, donor governments, 
especially the United Kingdom looked to funding think tanks to work along side the UN to 
increase its intelligence and strategic planning capabilities.  One think tank that the Secretary-
General has worked with is the Conflict Prevention and Peace Forum, which is funded by the 
Social Science Research Council (SSRC).  The forum as a staff of only four people who write 
country reviews for areas in which the United Nations becomes involved; they also set up 
workshops to inform and train United Nations personnel in areas relevant to the particular peace 
operation.  The efforts of the Conflict Prevention and Peace Forum have proven very useful.  As 
a result of an increasing dependency on a number of think tanks for strategic planning, the 
Department of Political Affairs has launched an internal review of the relationships between the 
Secretary-General and outside organizations.107
The Knowledge Project, headed by Dr. Thant Myint-U of the Department of Political 
Affairs, in cooperation with the Social Science Resources Council, is an in-house review that 
was spurred by the Brahimi Report.108  The project operates on the premise that the UN 
Secretariat needs a greater capacity for strategic planning so that it can provide senior officials 
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with options when the UN intervenes in a conflict.  It reviews the relationship that exists between 
the Secretariat and think tanks, and asks whether the cooperation served the UN’s purpose, 
whether the Secretariat should be associated in such a way with these outside organizations, and 
what would be the right relationship to develop between the Secretariat and the think tanks.  The 
Knowledge Project seeks to understand the Secretary-General’s information analysis needs; what 
the capabilities are currently available to him, and how they are being provided; and what 
additional outside resources will be necessary to fulfill the needs of the Secretariat, including 
relationships with think tanks and universities.  They also hope to suggest ways to utilize 
resources beyond those in geographic proximity to United Nations Headquarters.  At this time, 
the Knowledge Project is still in progress; the committee expects to deliver its conclusions to the 
Secretary-General sometime this June.  Preliminary findings suggest that think tanks and 
universities are great assets to the United Nations.  
The Knowledge Project is likely to conclude that problems of the Secretariat are as much 
the result of the demand side as the supply side; no formal information request process exists.  
Even if the Secretary-General had unlimited resources at his disposal, the Secretariat lacks any 
formal policy planning process; it is not designed to be proactive.  Its original purpose was to 
execute the decisions of the other organs of the United Nations.  As such the Secretariat is well 
equipped to handle the technical side of the process, but it lacks any formal mechanism or even 
the culture necessary to undertake strategic planning.109
The GAO report came to similar conclusions.110  EISAS was meant to solve this problem; 
it would have created a central place for all information and where all relevant work could be 
feed.  Outside organizations have the potential to provide the United Nations with vital 
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information and strategic planning abilities, which would otherwise be unavailable to the 
Organization due to current information-gathering restrictions.  But Secretariat must first 
complete organizational reform and revise how it understands its function before it will be able 
to fully utilize the resources available for strategic planning.
In reference to EISAS as proposed by the Brahimi Report, Director of DPKO Best 
Practices Unit, David Harland admits, “The capabilities that remain are spread around the 
Organization.”111  By dispersing the capabilities envisioned for the EISAS among a variety of 
units within the Secretariat, a fundamental importance of the recommendation has been lost.  The 
concentration of United Nations intelligence capacity within a single unit was meant to increase 
efficiency and effectiveness, which is impossible when the duties are spread among various 
departments and divisions because it requires coordinating the efforts of separate offices.  When 
these responsibilities remain within a single unit, coordination and cooperation are no longer 
issues.  If the United Nations is forced to seek necessary information and intelligence for 
peacekeeping operations from outside of the Organization, the issues of coordination and 
cooperation have the potential to become even more difficult.  
Although the Secretariat has not been allotted some of the far-reaching intelligence 
capabilities of EISAS, the entire significance of system was not lost in the modifications.  The 
Best Practices Unit has received greater attention since the release of the Brahimi Report, and 
greater emphasis has been placed on developing guidelines and standard operating procedures 
for multi-dimensional peacekeeping operations.  The Situation Center has been enhanced, and 
priority has been placed on gathering information during United Nations operations that may 
prove useful in future efforts of the United Nations.  Peacekeeping policy analysis has been 
identified as a task of the Department of Political Affairs, and the Department of Public 
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Information has dedicated more resources to efforts relating to Peacekeeping.  Any attention 
afforded to the subject of increasing the effectiveness of peacekeeping forces the Organization to 
recognize the significance of strategic planning to peacekeeping.  The debate that originated over 
EISAS has not ended.  The Knowledge Project promises to continue the discussion, and it may 
even force the Secretariat to examine problems with the structure of the organization, which is as 
much a problem as opposition of Member States.
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Conclusion: Brahimi Report Catalyst for Slow Progress
Peace and international stability are in the interest of all countries.  International 
collective security is a difficult goal to achieve.  It requires the political willingness and financial 
backing of individual sovereign states that most likely have no direct national interest in the 
situation.  UN Peacekeeping is an arrangement that best resembles genuine collective security.  
But the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) has been plagued with a lack of 
political will and financial difficulties.  The Report by the Panel on United Nations Peace 
Operations was meant to provide a means by which to prevail over these problems.  It is 
important to keep in mind that the Brahimi Panel was given only four months in which to 
identify the underlying difficulties of UN peace operations, and then make realistic 
recommendations that would improve the effectiveness and efficiency of peacekeeping.  Despite 
the unparalleled expertise of the panel, it would be unfair to demand perfection under such time 
restrictions.  The Brahimi Report should not be judged as a fix-all, but rather as a catalyst for 
reform and progress.  The Special Committee on Peace Operation recognized that it was only the 
beginning of reforms to come.112  Only a percentage of the Brahimi Panel’s suggestions have 
been followed and many have been altered, but the Brahimi Report has forced Member States 
and the Organization to scrutinize the existing mechanisms, triggering real progress.
No provision in the UN Charter establishes an authority for peacekeeping operations.  
Peacekeeping has suffered because it lacks clear definition, but the UN has repeatedly refused to 
set parameters that might restrict its use.  The first major step toward institutionalizing peace 
operations came in 1997, when the post of Under Secretary-General for Peacekeeping 
Operations was created.  The Brahimi Report sought to elevate the status of peacekeeping 
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operations further through budgetary reform, and force Member States to recognize the primacy 
of peacekeeping.  The pre-mandate commitment authority (PMCA) requires a level of trust in the 
Secretary-General and DPKO, and places a degree of importance on sufficient funding for 
peacekeeping operations that did not previously exist.  The Strategic Deployment Stocks (SDS) 
involves a substantial commitment of resources to peacekeeping missions that are not easily 
liquidated.  The After Action Report issued by the Best Practices Unit following MUNCI 
confirmed that the budgetary mechanisms of PMCA are in place and available to the Secretary-
General.113
The goal set for the SDS maintained at the United Nations Logistics Base (UNLB) is to 
acquire the resources and logistical capabilities to support the start-up of one traditional and one 
complex peacekeeping operation per annum, and it is on schedule to be completed.  The SDS 
differs from the suggestion of the Brahimi Report to acquire additional start-up kits to be kept at 
UNLB, for a total of five, because after serious debate, the cost-benefit analysis of the original 
suggestion proved to be inadequate.  The subject was not dismissed, though, once the original 
suggestion was abandoned.  Instead the Secretary-General was asked to submit an alternative and 
after several revisions, the results of the discussion spurred by the Brahimi Report have proven 
effective.  UNLB has already facilitated the deployment of the UN peace operations in Liberia 
and the Cote d’Ivoire, as well as the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection 
Commission and the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Iraq.  
Member States, after expressing some apprehension, have embraced peacekeeping as a 
legitimate power afforded to the United Nations.  The reoccurring arguments against budgetary 
reforms serve to highlight the significance of allocating finances; how money is spent is of great 
interest to states. 
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Progress has also been made toward improving the effectiveness of UN peace operations.  
Many of the mechanisms needed to deploy a peacekeeping operation rapidly and efficiently are 
in place.  The On-Call Lists for key military and civilian personnel, as well as crucial command 
positions for civilian police, exist and are operational.  The Rapid Deployment Level has been 
added to the United Nations Standby Arrangements System (UNSAS) and has received 
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) from two Member States.  Since the Brahimi Report, 
the number of participants in the UNSAS has increased significantly because the Brahimi Panel 
emphasized the value of peacekeeping to the international community.  The success of these 
mechanisms, nevertheless, hinges upon the political will of Member States, but there have been 
small signs that countries may be reevaluating a former indifference toward the fate of UN 
peacekeeping operations.  The intent of the budgetary reform was to increase the resources 
available to peacekeeping so that Member States might be more willing to contribute troops.  
The international community’s confidence in peacekeeping is a critical component in 
determining political will.  The hardships experienced by the UN missions to Bosnia and 
Rwanda in the 1990’s, coupled with an increase in the media exposure, caused the international 
community to loose confidence UN peacekeeping operations.  Under Secretary-General Jean-
Marie Guehenno hopes that an increase in the initial supplies for peacekeeping operations will 
lead to more effective and efficient missions, which will result in an increase in confidence in the 
abilities of the United Nations.  A renewal of confidence in the Organization that existed in the 
early 1990s may encourage countries to participate in the UNSAS, easing the burden on the 
Secretary-General to secure resources, especially troops, for peacekeeping operations,114 and 
there is reason to believe that it is possible.  The United Nations will look to UNSAS to field the 
upcoming mission to Haiti.   Member States have already committed troops to the operation in
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Haiti, including the United States, which has been reluctant to engage in recent peacekeeping 
operations, and Brazil, which has agreed to command the operation.115
But the success of peacekeeping is dependent on more than the political will of Member 
States.  It also requires the cooperation and coordination of well-established institutions that can 
meet the needs of peacekeeping; these entities must be forward looking to cope with the 
unpredictable nature of international relations.  The ECSP Information and Strategic Analysis 
System (EISAS) would have better equipped the UN to anticipate future conflicts, placing it in a 
better position to resolve the problem quickly, and its strategic analysis component would have 
made it easier for the UN to manage unprecedented situations.  But little progress has actually 
been made to improve UN intelligence capabilities.  The EISAS has been de-clawed and 
dispersed around the Organization, making a complex web of otherwise unconnected 
departments within the Secretariat.  This is exactly what the Brahimi Panel wanted to avoid.  
Previous attempts at restructuring the Secretariat have shown that it is a challenge to achieve 
effective interdepartmental coordination, due in part to lack of will among staff.  EISAS was 
meant to concentrate the necessary intelligence mechanisms into one entity, eliminating the need 
for complicated, time- and resource-consuming interdepartmental cooperation.  But Member 
States viewed the EISAS as threat to their national sovereignty and a potential to upset the 
delicate international balance of power.
Concerns Expressed Have Validity
The concerns raised by the Member States may seem petty and insignificant compared to 
the objectives of the Brahimi Report, but many of their concerns are warranted.  Peacekeeping 
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operations occur almost exclusively in developing countries, so developing countries take 
interest in when and in what conflicts the United Nations becomes involved.  Balance of power 
in the UN is frequently an issue that is raised by the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM).  
Developing states lack the access to the resources readily available to the developed states, 
especially in reference to information technology.116  Delegations that represent the developing 
countries tend to lack the depth and numbers enjoyed by the delegations from developed 
countries.  Also NAM does not have permanent representation on the Security Council, which is 
responsible for crafting peacekeeping operation mandates, and therefore developing countries are 
less able to influence the trajectory of the United Nations, despite possessing a majority in the 
General Assembly.
The desire to maintain the international balance of power and to guarantee national 
sovereignty drives international politics, which in turn affects states’ attitudes toward the UN.  
Developing countries are not only in competition with other states, but with the United Nations 
as well.  These Member States are wary that the UN will establish intelligence capabilities that 
can potentially be used against them to violate their national sovereignty.  Because of the 
technology gap that exists between developed and developing countries, the developed countries 
would have most likely equipped and staffed the proposed EISAS.  The concern for balance of 
power goes beyond abuse of intelligence capabilities; many Member States have called for 
reform of the Security Council because they believe the current framework creates an imbalance 
of power in favor of the already powerful Member States and excludes the interests of the 
smaller Members.  EISAS could potential widen the gap between the NAM and developed 
countries by making the United Nations further reliant on the later.
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Financing is a grave concern to the developing countries, because a vast majority of the 
world’s wealth is controlled by very few of the world’s countries.  In 2002, the total value of all 
the goods and services produced by the entire world was valued at 32,312,147 million U.S. 
dollars.  The richest seven countries account for over two-thirds of the total GDP; the United 
States alone produced roughly a third of the world’s goods.  With U.S. GDP reported at 
10,383,100 million U.S. dollars, the United States has a GNP roughly equal to the combined size 
of 201 out of the 208 economies tracked by the World Bank.117   Yet an increasing majority of 
peacekeeping troops come from low income Member States.  They tend to fully support the UN 
in its pursuit to maintain international peace and security, but they fear that they are bearing a 
greater share of the responsibilities.  
Money was an issue during every debate over suggested reforms.  The Non-aligned 
Movement would have liked the Peacekeeping Reserve Fund to be secondary to resolving UN 
debt to Member States.  The On-Call List sparked the question of who would pay to train the 
necessary military personnel and civilian police and personnel.  Because of their developing 
status, money is a legitimate concern to the NAM.  Many Member States are owed large 
arrearages for their contributions to peace operations; between 30 June 2003 and 29 February 
2004, the UN took out loans totaling approximately $152 million to support ongoing peace 
operations.118  By the end of 2003, the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force 
(UNDOF), which has monitored the cease-fire line between Israel and Syria since October 1974, 
had accrued approximately $26 million in unpaid assessments, which was money owed to 
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Member States that contribute troops to the Force.119  The cash shortage was due in part to 
substantial arrearages that developed countries owed the United Nations, particularly the United 
States.  
In 1998, Member States owed $977 million for the regular budget; the U.S., as the 
Organization’s largest contributor, accounted for nearly two-thirds of the total arrears.  The U.S. 
had accumulated such a substantial debt to the UN that the U.S. was in jeopardy of losing its vote 
in the General Assembly; because the U.S. failed to pay its UN dues, it did lose its seat on the 
ACABQ.  In June 1998, the U.S. owed the UN about $1.5 billion in dues and assessments.  This 
debt included over $965 million for peacekeeping operations, yet the U.S pushed for 
peacekeeping reform.120  The Clinton administration praised the Brahimi Report, in part because 
it did not require large sums of money.  The Democratic administration supported UN plans to 
expand the peacekeeping operations in Sierra Leone, southern Lebanon and the Ethiopia-Eritrea 
border, but the Republican Congress refused to appropriate adequate funds.121  In December 
2000, the United Nations was forced to modify the scale by which dues were assessed, and the 
U.S. share was reduced.  The United States has since devised a repayment plan with the UN 
based on the adjusted scale.  Had the U.S. kept current with its payments to the UN, the 
objections to the Brahimi Report voiced by the NAM would have been considerably weakened. 
Because of U.S. failure to pay its UN debts, the NAM had justification to impede the reforms. 
Before money could be spent on improving the current system, developing countries wanted
assurance that the UN would make good on its existing debt.
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New Issues Raised
Peacekeeping is a gray area for the United Nations.  There is no legal basis for 
peacekeeping to be found in the UN Charter, and although there are certain principles associated
with UN peacekeeping, the institution has never been defined.  As such, it is unclear what 
resources and capabilities should be placed at the disposal of the DPKO.  The constant debate 
over the finance and abuse of authority lends itself to a discussion over the definition of 
peacekeeping.  Although the UN has resisted defining peacekeeping because that any definition 
would be restrictive, to identify a general purpose of the DPKO and establish a sound legal 
stance for UN peacekeeping may strengthen arguments for reform.  
The United Nations increased reliance on outside organizations is another interesting 
issue raised in the aftermath of the Brahimi Report into which further would be worthwhile.  In 
both the areas of intelligence and military resources, the UN has sought outside sources to 
compensate for internal inadequacies.  The Knowledge Project will render a verdict on the worth 
of the relationship between the UN and non-profit organizations in terms of strategic planning.  
If the results are deemed favorable, it may justify the UN looking outside of the Organization to 
accomplish tasks otherwise made impossible by the concerns of Member States.  An in depth 
examination of the UN’s relationship with regional organizations and multinational forces may 
also expose a viable solution to the difficulties in securing peacekeeping troops.
Member States have shown a renewed interest in United Nations peacekeeping 
operations since the release of the Brahimi Report.  The Security Council and General Assembly 
have reaffirmed the UN’s role in the maintenance of international peace and security by 
fortifying its capacity for peacekeeping.  The fourth committee in their report to the General 
79
Assembly on 31 July 2001: “stress[ed] that the authority of the Security Council, as well as the 
United Nations, in the field of maintaining international peace and security, in any case, shall not 
be violated.”122  The Organization has reaffirmed its self as an important international actor.  The 
Brahimi Report is, in part, responsible for dispersing the apathy that afflicted UN peacekeeping 
operations in the later years of the Twentieth Century.   Collective security may be difficult to 
achieve, but the reflection, debate and action stimulated by the Brahimi Report has the potential 
to make peacekeeping a more effective instrument of the United Nations.
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